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Public Safety Legislation and the
Referendum Power: A Reexamination
By CHIP LowE*
The public referendum is one of the political reforms generated by
the Progressive movement during the first two decades of this century.'
The term broadly refers to the submission of a public issue or govern-
mental measure to a vote of the electorate.2 The vote may or may not be
binding on the governmental authority.
3
Referendum devices may be categorized by subject matter as well as
by the type of process used. Depending on the type of referendum and
the jurisdiction, the referendum may be mandated by the state constitu-
tion or the legislative body, or it may be invoked by the people through a
petition process. Constitutional amendments, for example, require a
mandatory referendum in every state except Delaware.4 In some states,
citizens may propose amendments by petition.5 Similarly, most states
* Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A.,
1976, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1979, University of South Dakota.
1. The Progressive movement generally describes a broad-based reformist activism that
arose during the early years of this century, which resulted in significant political and social
reforms. For a general analysis of the Progressive era, see 2 J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRA-
cIES 129-65 (1921); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); A. LINK, WOODROW
WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1954); THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (L. Gould ed. 1974).
2. See Johnson, Types of Referendum, in THE REFERENDUM DEVICE 19 (A. Ranney
ed. 1981). In most western nations, a referendum usually refers to the submission to the voters
of a political decision previously made by the government. Butler, The World Experience, in
THE REFERENDUM DEVICE, supra, at 176. For a review of the current referendum processes
in other Western countries, see REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND
THEORY (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978).
3. For an example of nonbinding referenda, see N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:37-1 (1964)
(countywide nonbinding referenda); cf Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 26 (1967) (resolution calling for Vietnam cease-fire held proper subject of ballot initiative
although beyond county government's power to effectuate by binding legislation); State v.
Board of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967) (resolution calling for withdrawal
from Vietnam).
4. Lee, The American Experience, 1778-1978, in THE REFERENDUM DEVICE, supra
note 2, at 47.
5. For a list of these states, see D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 38-39 (1984). See
also White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1132, 1133
(1952).
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require a mandatory referendum for certain types of legislative acts.
6
Some states permit the legislature to use the legislative referendum device
to direct that a bill be ratified by the voters as a condition for becoming
law.
7
The public referendum also may take the form of a comprehensive
ballot process through which voters may mandate that statutory meas-
ures be placed on the ballot. This type of referendum is invoked by the
timely filing of a petition signed by a specified percentage of the electo-
rate.8 By this method, the electorate assumes the powers of a super-legis-
lature with the ability to propose and to enact laws, using the initiative,9
or to suspend bills enacted by the legislature pending voter ratification,
using the permissive referendum.10 Many of the twenty-three states that
authorize the initiative and the permissive referendum extend both
processes to local governments either by constitutional provision' I or by
6. Mandatory referenda may be required by the state constitution, see, e.g., KY. CONST.
§ 171 (taxation); S.D. CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (change of county boundaries), or by statute, see,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 812-813 (1974) (adopting home rule charter); N.Y. LOCAL
FIN. LAW § 35.00 (McKinney 1958) (authorizing bond issues); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-103
(1982) (changing the form of city government).
7. See, e.g., OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. The legislative referendum is employed in 19
states. Lee, supra note 4, at 47.
8. The following is a chronological listing of current statewide referenda provisions and
the year in which the process originally was adopted: South Dakota (1898), S.D. CONST. art.
III, § 1; Utah (1900), UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1(2); Oregon (1902), OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
Nevada (1904), NEv. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 1-6; Montana (1906), MONT. CONST. art. III, §§ 4-
8; Oklahoma (1907), OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-8; Michigan (1908), MICH. CONST. art. II,
§ 9; Missouri (1908), MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 49-53; Maine (1909), ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3,
§ 17; Arkansas (1909), ARK. CONST. amend. VII; Colorado (1910), COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1;
Arizona (1910), ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1; New Mexico (1911), N.M. CONST. art. IV, § I
(referendum only); California (1912), CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-9; Idaho (1912), IDAHO
CONST. art. III, § 1; Nebraska (1912), NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4; Ohio (1912), OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 1; Washington (1912), WASH. CONST. amend. LXXII; North Dakota (1914),
N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-10; Maryland (1915), MD. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1-3 (referendum
only); Massachusetts (1918), MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII. Forty years lapsed before
Alaska ratified its constitution, which contains the initiative and referendum. ALASKA CONST.
art. XI. In 1967, Wyoming became the most recent state to embrace a statutory process.
WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52.
9. Wyatt v. Clark, 299 P.2d 799, 801 (Okla. 1956) ("Initiative is the power reserved to
the people by the constitution to propose bills or laws and to enact or reject them independent
of legislative [sic] assembly."); see E. BACON & M. WYMAN, DIRECT ELECTIONS AND LAV
MAKING BY POPULAR VOTE 1 (1912).
10. Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978);
State ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33 S.D. 40, 144 N.W. 730 (1913). This form has also been
referred to as the "petition referendum," Lee, supra note 4, at 47, the "protest referendum,"
Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenome-
non, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 245 (1975), and the "popular referendum," D. MAGLEBY, supra note
5, at 36.
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST.
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statute. 12 Several jurisdictions that have not adopted the permissive bal-
lot at the state level nevertheless permit it at the local level 13 or enable
home rule cities to adopt it. 14
Where comprehensive ballot processes have been embraced, they
have been used repeatedly at both the state and local levels.15 Recent
referenda on controversial political issues such as property tax limitation,
nuclear freeze, and gun control have rekindled public awareness of this
political remedy, renewed the debate concerning its purposes, limitations,
and merits,1 6 and spawned a modest amount of academic commentary.
17
art. II, § 11; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 21; MONT. CONST. art.
XI, § 8; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 4; OKLA CONsT. art. V, § 5; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(5);
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1 (2); Wyo. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.28.060 (1962); IDAHO CODE § 50-501 (1980); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 78.220 (Vernon 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-12-01 to -13 (1968); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35-17.220 to .240 (1964).
13. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-157 (West 1967); KY. REV. STAT. § 89-600
(1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1283 (West 1951); Miss. CODE ANN. § 21-9-65 (Supp.
1984); N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:74-5 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 100-104 (McKinney
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 36030-36064 (Purdon 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-17-10 to
-30 (Law. Co-op 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.07 (West 1985) (authorizes legislative referen-
dum for county government).
14. Home rule refers to the right of the people of a local area to create their own local
government, to define its powers, and to describe the boundaries within which it is to exist.
Younger v. Board of Supervisors, 93 Cal. App. 3d 864, 869, 155 Cal. Rptr. 921, 924 (1979);
see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35A.29.170 (Special Pamphlet 1986); W. VA. CODE § 8-
12-14 (1984); see also City of Winter Springs v. Florida Land Co., 413 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (city charter provided for referendum).
15. It has been estimated that 12,000 to 15,000 propositions have been placed on state-
wide ballots since the turn of the century and that as many as 16,000 local ballot issues were
decided in one recent presidential election year alone. Clubb & Traugott, National Patterns of
Referenda Voting: The 1968 Election, in PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN URBAN SOCIETY 137 (H.
Hahn ed. 1972).
16. See generally D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 5-7. Part of the debate has centered on
the call for a national referendum. See Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary
Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965 (1979); Snyder, The Proposed National Initiative Amendment:
A Participatory Perspective on Substantive Restrictions and Procedural Requirements, 18 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1981). For a summary of statewide ballot proposals through 1976, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND RECALL: A RESUME
OF STATE PROVISIONS (1976), reprinted in Proposed Voter Initiative Constitutional Amend-
ment: Hearings on S Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1977).
17. Professor Price notes that, since the adoption of these devices, interest on the part of
the academic community gradually has waned. Price, supra note 10, at 244. Leading works
published contemporaneously with the adoption of referenda include: J. BARNETT, THE OP-
ERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL IN OREGON (1915); C. BEARD &
B. SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL
(1912); J. BOYLE, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (1912); C. LOBINGER, THE PEOPLE'S
LAW (1909); W. MUNRO, THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL (1912); E.
OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (1912). For articles regarding the nature
and purpose of initiative referendum devices, see Bourne, Jr., Functions of the Initiative, Refer-
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Many courts have observed that initiative and permissive referen-
dum processes essentially establish the electorate as a law-making body
coequal with the elected assembly, 18 thereby creating the potential for
conflict. 19 In theory, the permissive referendum process allows a small
percentage of voters to place on the ballot every measure enacted by the
endum and Recall, 43 ANNALS 3 (1912); Campbell, The Initiative and Referendum, 10 MICH.
L. REV. 427 (1912). For World War II era articles, see Houghton, Arizona's Experience with
the Initiative and Referendum, 29 N.M. HIST. REV. 183 (1954); Johnston, The Initiative and
Referendum in Washington, 36 PAC. Nw. Q. 29 (1945); Key & Crouch, The Initiative, Refer-
endum and Recall in California, 6 PUBLICATIONS SOC. Sci. 423 (1939).
Commentaries offering an overview of the substantive and procedural restraints on consti-
tutional and statutory ballot processes in individual states include: Fordham & Leach, The
Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 495 (1950); Grossman, The Initiative and
Referendum Process: The Michigan Experience, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 77 (1981); Lowe, Restric-
tions on Initiative and Referendum Powers in South Dakota, 28 S.D.L. REV. 53 (1982); Stew-
art, Law of Initiative Referendum in Massachusetts, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 455 (1977);
Trautman, Initiative and Referendum in Washington-A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REV. 55 (1973);
Note, Judicial Limitations on the Initiative and Referendum in California Municipalities, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1966); Comment, The Scope of Initiative and Referendum in California,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717 (1966).
Commentaries treating the topic of campaign financing of ballot measures include: Fox,
Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statu-
tory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 KY. L.J. 75 (1978); Mickenberg, Con-
stitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 12 Sw. U. L. REV.
527 (1980); Mueller & Parrinello, Constitutionality of Limits on Ballot Measure Contributions,
57 N.D.L. REV. 391 (1981).
A few commentaries address the issue of zoning by referenda: Glenn, State Law Limita-
tions on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 265 (1978); Note, Zoning by Initiative in California: A CriticalAnalysis, 12 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 903 (1979); Note, Zoning-Adjudication by Labels: Referendum Rezoning and
Due Process, 55 N.C.L. REV. 517 (1977).
The effect of referenda on civil rights is analyzed in the following: Bell, The Referendum:
Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); Murasky, James v.
Valtierra, Housing Discrimination by Referendum?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1971); Sager,
Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest Cities Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978); Seely, The Public Referendum and Minority
Group Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881 (1970); Sirico,
The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1980); Note,
Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135
(1981).
18. See, e.g., Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors,
108 Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d 391 (1972); State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 187 P.
641 (1920); Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966).
19. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, 102
Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921):
There being therefore two distinct, concurrent legislative bodies, having power to
deal with the same subject at the same time, and the people having at the same time
the right by referendum to review and possibly nullify the action of the legislature, it
is quite natural that a conflict should occasionally arise between the two legislative
bodies ....
Id. at 611, 133 N.E. at 463.
[Vol. 37
state legislature or local council2O whose ability to govern may be sub-
stantially impaired. In those jurisdictions where deferred laws are sus-
pended until approved by the voters, the permissive referendum can
nullify vital measures whose importance to society depends upon the cer-
tainty of timely enforcement.21 Consequently, the twenty-three jurisdic-
tions that have made the permissive referendum part of their law-making
process limit the ability of the electorate to veto certain types of legisla-
tion.22 The two most common substantive exclusions from the permis-
sive referendum process are laws that deal with state fiscal matters and
laws that are necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace,
health, and safety.
The fiscal limitation-the more specific of the two restrictions-has
been phrased variously as excluding from the referendum appropriation
measures, 23 tax levies,24 or any act necessary for the support of state gov-
ernment and its existing institutions. 25 The public safety limitation, on
the other hand, is omnibus in scope. Like many restrictions, the public
safety exception seeks to prevent the abuse of legislative power.
The public safety exception operates in one of three ways. First, in
nine of the twenty-three referendum states, a law that purports to have
been enacted to preserve the public peace, health, or safety takes effect
immediately upon passage, subject to voter veto by permissive referen-
dum. Enforcement of the act is not suspended pending the election.
26
20. Signature requirements vary from state to state. Wyoming imposes one of the more
stringent requirements, requiring 15% of those voting in the preceding general election, with
signators residing in at least two-thirds of the counties. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(c). In
Massachusetts, a measure may be referred with signatures totaling two percent of the votes
cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. MAss. CONST. amend. XLVIII, pt. 3, § 3. For a
compendium of state requirements, see D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 38.
21. For example, a legislative act creating a remedy for victims of toxic chemicals or
establishing a task force to develop a cure for AIDS will be of little value to the public if it is
suspended pending the next general election. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7; CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 9. In California, the referred act is automatically suspended pending the outcome of
the referendum. Id. In other states, the act may be suspended if the number of signatures
canvassed is greater than the number required to place the act on the ballot. See NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 3.
22. See supra note 8.
23. See, eg., MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 3.
24. See, ag., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a); OHIO CONsT. art. II, § l(d).
25. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3); S.D. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
26. Arkansas: ARK. CONST. amend. VII; Idaho: Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620,
57 P.2d 1068 (1936) (emergency legislation effective immediately and remains in effect unless
defeated at a referendum election or repealed); IDAHO CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 22; Maryland:
Biggs v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Parks & Planning Comm'n, 269 Md. 352, 306 A.2d 220
(1973) (An emergency bill, although not subject to judicial review as to existence of an emer-
gency, may remain in effect only 30 days after it has been rejected in a referendum vote.); MD.
CONST. art. XVI, § 2; Massachusetts: Molesworth v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 347 Mass.
PUBLIC SAFETY LEGISLATIONMarch 1986]
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Second, in Utah the legislature has the power to preempt the voter's op-
tion without regard to the nature of the measure, simply by adopting the
law by a two-thirds majority. 27 Finally, acts passed as public safety
measures in the remaining thirteen states are constitutionally barred
from voter review and possible veto.28 In these states, there is considera-
47, 196 N.E.2d 312 (1964); MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIL pts. 2, 3, § 2; Stewart, The Law of
Initiative Referendum in Massachusetts, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 455 (1977); Michigan: MICH.
CONST. art. II, § 9; Grossman, The Initiative and Referendum Process: The Michigan Experi-
ence, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 101 n.140 (1981); Montana: MONT. CONST. art. III, § 5; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 1-2-205 (1985) (no public safety exception); Nebraska: Klosterman v. Marsh,
180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966) (reversing district court decision to enjoin the Secretary
of State from permitting a state income tax act to be referred to the electorate); NEB. CONST.
art. III, §§ 3, 27: Nevada: Morton v. Howard, 49 Nev. 405, 248 P. 44 (1926) (referred law not
suspended or annulled until majority of electors vote against it); NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 1;
North Dakota: Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 24 N.W.2d 737 (1946) (property tax declared
an emergency measure takes effect immediately, but is subject to referendum); N.D. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 25, 41.
The Model Constitution for state government also recommends this form. MODEL
STATE CONST. art. IV, § 404 (National Mun. League 5th ed. 1948). The sixth edition substi-
tutes a legislative referendum in place of an optional referendum. Id. at app. § .02 (6th ed.
1968).
27. UTAH CONsT. art. VI, § 25 (1900).
28. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7 ("The referendum shall not be applied ... to laws
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety."); ARIZ. CONsT.
art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3) ("except laws immediately necessary for the preservation of the public
peace, health or safety"); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) ("The referendum is the power of the
electors to approve or reject statutes ... except urgency statutes .... ); COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 1 ("The second power hereby reserved is the referendum, and it may be ordered except as to
laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety ...."); ME.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17 ("[u]pon written petition of electors.., requesting that one or more
Acts ... passed by the Legislature, but not then in effect by reason of the provisions of the
preceding section, [i.e., measures immediately necessary for the preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety] be referred to the people"); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 52(a) ("A referen-
dum may be ordered, except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety ...."); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The people reserve the power to
disapprove, suspend and annul any law ... except... laws providing for the preservation of
the public peace, health or safety ...."); OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(d) ("[E]mergency laws
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into
immediate effect.... The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to the referen-
dum."); OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The second power is the referendum, and it may be
ordered, except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health
or safety .... ); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(3)(a) ("The people reserve to themselves the referen-
dum power ... to approve or reject ... any Act ... that does not become effective earlier than
90 days after the end of the session .... ); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("[T]he people expressly
reserve.., the right to require any law ... be submitted to a vote of the electors ... except
laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety
...."); WASH. CONST. amend. LXXII(b) ("The second power reserved by the people is the
referendum, and it may be ordered on any act.., except such laws as may be necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety ...."); WYo. CONST. art. III,
§ 52(g) ("The referendum shall not be applied to ... laws necessary for the immediate preser-
vation of the public peace, health or safety ....").
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ble disagreement as to whether, and to what extent, the courts may re-
view a state legislative declaration of public safety.29 The courts are
similarly split on the reviewability of public safety ordinances passed by
local government.
30
Unlike the referenda on constitutional amendments and initiatives,
the permissive referendum has been exercised infrequently at the state
level over the last twenty-five years.31 Use of the device at the local level
has been more pervasive. 32 Public safety clauses, on the other hand, con-
tinue to be popular and are included in a considerable amount of contem-
porary legislation.
33
Courts that are called upon to construe and determine the binding
29. Eight of the thirteen state supreme courts have refused to review the legislative find-
ing or have done so on only a very limited basis. These states are Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Maine, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See infra note 158 &
accompanying text. Three states have reviewed the legislative determination. These are the
states of Missouri, New Mexico, and Washington. See infra notes 160, 162-72 & accompany-
ing text. Two states, Alaska and Wyoming, have not yet faced the issue. The issue also arises
in nonsuspension states. One who files a referendum petition also may claim that the law
sought to be referred should not take effect in the interim. Courts from those states that have
decided the issue have not been willing to review the public safety declaration that places the
act immediately in effect. See Molesworth v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 47,
196 N.E.2d 312 (1964); Read v. City of Scottsbluff, 179 Neb. 410, 138 N.W.2d 47 (1965);
Cuthbert v. Smutz, 68 N.D. 578, 282 N.W. 494 (1938).
30. Referral of local legislation may be required by the referendum provision in the state
constitution, see supra note 11, or by statute, see supra notes 12-13. The eight nonreview or
limited-review jurisdictions apply the same standard of review to public safety ordinances at
the municipal level. See cases cited infra note 158. The three states that will review a safety
act passed by the legislature-Missouri, New Mexico, and Washington-also will review one
adopted by a local council. See cases cited infra notes 170, 172.
In addition, one who seeks to refer a city ordinance in the states of Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1282 to -1283 (West 1953), and Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-36050
to -36051 (Purdon 1957), will have to convince a court to overturn a finding of public necessity
by the city council in order to get the matter before the voters.
31. See Price, supra note 10, at 245. Since 1960, for example, the permissive referendum
has been invoked against a legislative act twice in Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, and
Nevada; three times in Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma; four times in California
and Massachusetts; five times in Oregon; six times in South Dakota; and seven times in Wash-
ington. Letters from the respective Secretaries of State to author (copies of letters on file with
The Hastings Law Journal).
32. One commentary suggests that for each state ballot measure as many as 50 local
propositions may be submitted to the voters during an election. Clubb & Traugott, supra note
15, at 137.
33. The prevalent use of safety clauses prompted a commentator from an earlier era to
label the practice a "subterfuge." Legislation-The Repeal of the Referendum in Colorado, 43
HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Legislation]. A random, but not scientific,
sample of recent enactments indicates that this legislative habit remains unabated. Arizona,
1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws, 2d Reg. Sess., table IV (Supp.) (66 emergency acts of 398 passed);
Arkansas, 1983 Ark. Acts, parallel ref. tables (Supp.) (314 emergency acts of 937 passed);
Nebraska, 1984 Neb. Laws, app. cross ref. table (Supp.) (81 emergency acts of 300 passed);
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effect of a legislative public safety declaration 34 must determine whether
the permissive referendum should play a significant role in a commu-
nity's political decision-making process, or whether it should function
only as a check on governmental power. 35 When properly applied, the
public safety exception should minimize the conflict between the voters
and the legislative body by giving the people the option to oversee most
legislative actions without destroying the ability of the assembly to enact
measures to resolve a temporary crisis. If the courts view the legislative
finding as nonjusticiable, however, the legislature or local council may
circumvent the ballot option and thwart a threatened referendum simply
by declaring that the legislation is necessary to preserve the public
welfare.
36
Oregon, 1983 Or. Laws, comp. sec. tables (288 emergency acts of 831 passed); South Dakota,
1984 S.D. Sess. Laws, parallel table interim (Supp.) (2 emergency acts of 363 passed).
34. Arguably the initiative renders the permissive referendum obsolete because the objec-
tive of the referendum-the veto of a measure-can be accomplished by initiating a repeal of
the act. See Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 248 P.2d 324 (1952). This position is also taken by
one advocate of the national direct ballot process. Allen. supra note 16, at 968 n.12. Most
states, however, make it more difficult to initiate a law by requiring a greater number of signa-
tures to qualify an item for the ballot. In Arizona, for example, initiatives require signatures
by fifteen percent of the voters, as opposed to five percent for referenda. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 1, § 1; see also ARK. CONST. amend. VII (eight percent versus six percent); OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 2 (eight percent versus five percent); WASH. CONST. amend. XXX (eight percent
versus four percent); cf. Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 738, 24 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1946)
(referendum more efficient process for people to reject laws).
Although the majority rule allows repeal by initiative, e.g., Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486,
19 P.2d 679 (1933); McKee v. City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 616 P.2d 969 (1980), the
minority rule prevents use of the initiative to refer a measure not subject to the referendum,
e.g. Myers v. City Council, 241 Cal. App. 2d 237, 243, 50 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (1966) (repeal of
tax ordinance); Commonwealth v. Marks, 7 Berks 116 (Penn. 1914), and precludes the referral
of only part of a public safety law when the referral would circumvent the act, e.g. State ex rel.
Pennock v. Reeves, 27 Wash. 2d 739, 179 P.2d 961 (1947). Moreover, a repealer may not be
an effective remedy when suspension of the law pending the vote is not permitted, as was the
case with the purchase of a railroad. See Gravning v. Zellmer, 291 N.W.2d 751 (S.D. 1980).
Finally, the Progressives intended the referendum to be a remedial device separate and apart
from the initiative. "If the people had been content to adopt that plan alone, they would not
have reserved the right of referendum at all." State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302,
315, 147 P. 11, 17 (1915).
35. The permissive referendum has been described as "a gun behind the door." C.
ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA 163 (1972). As one court stated:
The potential virtue of the "I. & R." [initiative and referendum] does not reside in
the good statutes ... initiated, nor in the bad statutes ... that are killed. Rather, the
greatest efficiency of the "I. & R." rests in the wholesome restraint imposed automat-
ically upon the general assembly and the governor and the possibilities of that latent
power when called into action by the voters.
Nolan v. Clendening, 93 Ohio St. 264, 277-78, 112 N.E. 1029, 1032 (1915).
36. The power of the legislative body to cancel the referral of a legislative decision by
declaring the act necessary for public welfare has prompted little commentary, but that com-
mentary is generally negative. Ewing, The Emergency Epidemic, 4 STATE GOV'T 3 (1931);
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This Article focuses on one of the more common restrictions on the
exercise of the permissive referendum at the state and local levels-the
public safety exception. The Article first examines the origins and polit-
ical implications of the initiative and referendum processes.37 Next, the
Article reviews the traditional judicial deference to legislative declara-
tions of emergency that require laws to become effective immediately
upon passage. The Article then analyzes the two dominant early judicial
approaches to construing the public safety exception to the referendum
process. The Article compares effective date clauses with public safety
clauses in light of the political question doctrine and concludes that the
judiciary should play a more active role in the review of legislative public
safety declarations. Finally, the Article proposes several factors that
courts should balance in order to determine whether a legislative declara-
tion of public safety should be permitted to prevent referral of a bill for
popular ratification or veto.
The Permissive Referendum: A Political Assessment
Ballot Processes in General
Most research by political scientists on direct democracy fails to dif-
ferentiate between different forms of referenda in assessing their fre-
quency, their effects on the political process, and related issues of voter
behavior. Discussions of ballot measures that are initiated by petition
predominate in the literature partly because this form is used more fre-
quently than other types of referenda. 38 Regardless of the procedure
Legislation-Emergency Legislation, 44 HARv. L. Rv. 851, 854 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
Emergency Legislation]; Legislation, supra note 33, at 817; Note, Judicial Review of Exceptions
from the Referendum, 10 CALIF. L. Rv. 371, 383 (1922); Note, And to Declare an Emergency,
I OHIO ST. L.J. 40 (1935); Note, The Emergency Clause, 19 OR. L. REv. 73 (1930).
Interestingly, the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1874, which was a model for the Progres-
sives, also shielded laws of an "urgent" nature from the referendum. See 1 J. BRYCE, MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACIES 374-75 (1921). The arbitrary enactment of urgency measures to
circumvent the referendum was criticized by scholars of that day. S. DEPLOIGE, THE REFER-
ENDUM IN SWITZERLAND 146-50 (1898). Professor Bryce in his treatise relates an anecdote
about a member of the Swiss assembly who opposed a declaration of urgency with respect to
certain legislation. The member told the story of a man who desired to eat a chicken during
Lent; he baptized it as a fish, and his conscience was clear. In like manner, he argued, the
legislature was attempting to baptize an act as urgent, when clearly it was not. 1 J. BRYCE,
supra, at 375 n.2.
37. This discussion purposely omits the problems posed by specific types of legislation,
most notably minority legislation. For an analysis of this threat and the call for judicial pro-
tection, see Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1978). See also articles cited supra note 17.
38. See Lee, supra note 4, at 49-50. Of the several thousand statewide propositions de-
cided over the last 25 years, only a few were placed on the ballot through the permissive
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used to place an issue on the ballot, the question of whether popular law-
making leads to rational decisions or to better government is the same.
The research on initiatives, therefore, is a valuable starting point for eval-
uating the permissive referendum.
The permissive referendum, like the initiative, was one of several
Progressive reforms designed to increase direct citizen participation in
government, unfettered by intermediate institutions. 39 At the core of the
referendum is a definition of democracy based on a faith in the people:
At the heart of all notions about the contributions to be made by par-
ticipatory democracy ... is a belief in the deliberative and moral po-
tential of ordinary people; that given the proper education and
environment, people can be both responsible and reflective. At its base
is a faith in the capacity of perfectly ordinary human beings to govern
themselves wisely.4°
The popular referendum zealously promotes this faith by making "every
man his own legislature.
' '4 1
The objective of democracy for the populists is to give those who
must live with governmental policies the opportunity to select those poli-
cies directly. This objective assumes that "issues rather than candidates'
promises or images are the main substance of politics."'42 It also assumes
that a policy based on popular will results in the best decision because it
is the most legitimate.4 3 A dogmatic populist would not contend that
individuals function in a social and political vacuum, but that, although
people sometimes may behave irrationally, they should have the right to
make their own mistakes. 44 Under this view, individual participation in
the existing political institutions encourages citizens to become better ed-
ucated about those institutions. This education enhances each citizen's
decision-making ability and helps him to develop a democratic personal-
ity that considers the welfare of others as well as his own self-interest.
4 5
referendum process. Compare supra note 31 (frequency of use of permissive referenda) with D.
MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at app. C (frequency of use of initiatives).
39. The suggested reforms included direct primaries, home rule for cities, direct election
of United States Senators, and women's suffrage. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 23.
40. Greenberg, Industrial Democracy and the Democratic Citizen, 43 J. POL. 964, 965
(1981).
41. J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL IN
OREGON 16 (1915).
42. Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience
1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 331-32 (1975).
43. Rousseau proclaimed that "[a]ny law which the people in person [have] not ratified is
null; it is not a law." J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ch. XV, at 145 (R. Harrington
trans. 2d ed. 1893).
44. H. HAMILTON & S. COHEN, POLICY MAKING BY PLEBISCITE: SCHOOL REFERENDA
255 (1974).
45. Greenberg, supra note 40, at 967. Aristotle's defense of participatory democracy ac-
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Although the populists succeeded in their promotion of ballot
processes at the turn of the century, they did not press for the abolition of
the existing forms of representative law-making bodies. Indeed, the
populists advocated the initiative and referendum processes as much for
their remedial qualities as for their utopian ones. The ballot device was
one method of breaking the control held by special interest groups and
reducing the corruption of legislators and other political officials.46
Thus, the process was not intended to supplant legislatures and city
councils, but to complement other reforms in leading to a more open and
responsive government. 47
Despite the widespread adoption of direct legislative devices, polit-
ical scientists generally have not shared in the enthusiasm for direct legis-
lation as an alternative to representative institutions, or even as a
remedial device of last resort.48 Much of their criticism focuses on either
the deficiencies of the American voting public or on the shortcomings of
the ballot process as compared to representative law-making. There are
several principal objections to the ballot process. Those who oppose the
direct legislative process assert that it suffers from two defects that in-
hibit effective decision-making. First, the process eschews the delibera-
tion, debate, and compromise that is the heart of representative
legislative action. Instead, the process "forces an all or nothing policy
decision on the question as formulated by the sponsors alone. ' '49 Re-
search in the area of public school referenda, for example, has led observ-
ers to remark that "[ilt would be difficult to argue that plebiscitary
democracy in school districts inhibits the incidence of conflict or that it is
a very efficacious instrument of conflict resolution." 50
Second, legislative decision-making, unlike the ballot process, con-
siders the intensity of demands as well as the percentage of the popula-
tion that supports the demands. Proponents of this view claim that
knowledges that it may not be the best way to "judge" issues of public policy, but that it serves
the first principle, or end, of politics-the perfection of man. Winthrop, Aristotle on Par-
ticipatory Democracy, 11 J. NE. POL. Sci. A. 151, 170 (1978).
46. One commentator points out that "[t]o the Progressives, it was important to elevate
to positions of political power the enlightened, dispassionate, independent citizen. Even more
important, however, were the institutional and procedural reforms that would excise or se-
verely limit the power of special interests, political parties, and corporations." D. MAGLEBY,
supra note 5, at 22. For a brief account of the control exercised by the Southern Pacific Rail-
road in California, see L. TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL PROCESS 34-35 (1977).
47. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 23.
48. See Price, supra note 10, at 244.
49. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 184.
50. H. HAMILTON & S. COHEN, supra note 44, at 174.
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individual voters cannot be relied upon to consider this important factor
in decision-making. 5' Public opinion polls show that the preferences of
all voters are not of equal intensity.52 Moreover, research on voter
demographics, rationality, turnout, and other aspects of voter behavior,
as well as the exclusion of large segments of the population from the
initiative process, 53 demonstrates the error of the central populist as-
sumption that the vote is representative of the public will. 54 One promi-
nent critic, David Magleby, claims that "the process of direct legislation
is prone to considerable misrepresentation. ' 55  Other commentators
charge that "asking voters to pass judgment on substantive policy ques-
tions strains their information and interest, leading them to decisions
that may be inconsistent with their own desires."
'5 6
Voters themselves tend to undermine the legitimacy of the initiative
process. Studies indicate that, in the weeks preceding an election, a ma-
jority of voters know nothing about highly publicized propositions that
will appear on the ballot5 7 and wait until the eve of the election to make
up their minds.5 8 Additionally, more people vote on gubernatorial and
presidential candidates than on issue propositions.5 9 According to one
commentator, the initiative and referendum almost universally fail as a
means for stimulating citizen participation:
Voters appear to see proposition campaigns as they see most matters of
government: they pay only limited attention, leaving to the activists
and other attentive members of the public the task of closely monitor-
ing politics. Voters are not very interested in most propositions-in-
cluding some controversial ones, such as the nuclear power initiative
or the equal rights amendment; they become very interested in only a
51. Two commentators have noted:
The legislative process is responsive to intensity because legislators (consciously or
unconsciously) ask themselves how much the interested parties care about the issue
since they want to find out what the cost in votes and other forms of campaign
support will be of disappointing one side or the other.... While politicians inevita-
bly are imperfect in their calculations about intensity, voters are unlikely to make
such judgments at all, particularly when their views are channeled through the refer-
endum process. Nor are they likely to be disposed or able to make calculations about
the possible ways in which a policy which they desire might detract from other of
their preferences-such as for civil peace.
Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum
Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 753, 768-69 (1968).
52. H. HAMILTON & S. COHEN, supra note 44, at 249.
53. A large number of eligible adults do not register to vote.
54. H. HAMILTON & S. COHEN, supra note 44, at 249.
55. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 144.
56. Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 51, at 767.
57. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 128.





Referendum voters tend more often to be "predominantly white, af-
fluent, better-educated, and of a higher subjective social class" than vot-
ers as a whole.6' From data gathered during the 1968 election, observers
have concluded that "there seems little reason to believe that the politi-
cally alienated and disaffected ... exerted a major influence upon the
collective outcome of referendum elections. ... '62 These findings chal-
lenge the claim that ballot options lead to more representative decisions
or reduce political alienation. 63 Complicated and technically worded
proposals further discourage participation by less sophisticated voters.64
Confusion may undermine the decision-making process by encouraging
voters to vote in the negative. Some campaigns explicitly exploit this
confusion: "Confused? Many are. Play it Safe-When in Doubt, Vote
No!' 65 Even the location of a measure on the ballot can affect voter
response. Measures that do not appear near the top of the ballot are less
likely to pass.66 These factors may help to explain why California voters
have rejected two-thirds of all initiative propositions. 67
Opponents of direct democracy also refute the claim that initiatives
and referenda advance the popular will by empowering the disen-
franchised. According to one study, the outcome of statewide referenda
is not determined by the alienated or disaffected, but rather by "the deci-
sions of a small but interested, well-informed, and politically sophisti-
cated segment of the larger electorate." 68 Research in the State of
Washington, however, seems to support the populist claim. There, over
one quarter of the initiatives were spawned by temporary, spontaneous,
and less affluent interest groups, such as the League of Women Voters,
public employees, consumers, pensioners, and sports enthusiasts.69 Nev-
ertheless, representation of the whole population is by no means assured.
In California, for example, low-budget groups such as environmentalists
that use the process do not necessarily select issues that most citizens
would like to have decided by the ballot process.70 In addition, the signa-
ture requirement for statewide measures, which in the State of California
60. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 127.
61. Lee, supra note 4, at 55.
62. Clubb & Traugott, supra note 15, at 165.
63. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 159-65.
64. Id. at 144.
65. Id. at 142.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Lee, supra note 4, at 58.
68. Clubb & Traugott, supra note 15, at 167.
69. Bone & Benedict, supra note 42, at 333.
70. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 182.
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approaches five hundred thousand,7 1 combined with the limited time in
which to gather the signatures, forecloses the process to all but either the
well financed or the well organized. 72 Moreover, the "act of setting the
agenda by deciding which proposals to drop may be just as important a
step as determining the outcome of those proposals which [are]
retained.
'73
The predominance of special interest groups in the ballot processes
raises additional concerns, such as the influence of campaign spending on
the outcome of a vote. Clearly, the process is expensive, with millions of
dollars spent campaigning for or against ballot measures. 74 Studies indi-
cate that, although proponents of a measure cannot buy success at the
polls, opponents can encourage a measure's defeat by outspending the
proponents, particularly if voters are uncommitted on the issue.
75
Critics also charge that ballot propositions disrupt the two-party
system and hasten the ascension of single-issue politics. This criticism is
related closely to the notion that direct legislation is a divisive process
that substitutes conflict and "either/or" propositions for compromise
and consensus. Mr. Magleby defines the problem as follows:
The initiative weakens political parties because it allows groups to
force public decision on issues framed by the groups themselves....
The traditional party roles of weighing competing interests, achieving
compromise, and moderating demands in order to appeal to the maxi-
mum number of voters are not played by the parties in this process
because they are not the participants. Single-issue groups may include
71. Id. at 68. Circulators also must gather enough signatures to compensate for those
voided due to illegibility, lack of voter registration, or wrong precinct.
72. Id. at 76. It was reported that proponents of Proposition 22 in California paid a
professional circulator $300,000 for signatures. L. TALLIAN, supra note 46, at 102. The un-
successful initiated proposal was aimed at farm workers and rendered specified types of strikes
and boycotts unlawful. Id. at 208.
73. Bone & Benedict, supra note 42, at 332. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, in which
Mr. Magleby states:
Which people rule in direct legislation? Those who set the legislative agenda
and those who actually vote on that agenda. Neither the issues put before the voters
nor those voters who actually decide them are representative. The people who rule
under direct legislation tend to be those who can understand and use the process.
Less educated, poorer, and nonwhite citizens are organizationally and financially ex-
cluded from setting the direct legislation agenda because their own issue agendas are
less articulated and because they lack the resources and personal efficacy to attempt a
petition circulation and direct legislation campaign.
Id. at 183-84.
74. For example, in 1982 total campaign spending in California was approximately $120
million, with $36 million of that total earmarked for ballot measure contests. D. MAGLEBY,
supra note 5, at 149. In 1979, the State of California spent $6.7 million in administering a
special ballot election. Id. at 58.
75. Id. at 146-51.
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some of these concerns in their campaign strategy, but there is no insti-
tutional means to counter their issue perspective, and the propositions
are thus typically more extreme than they would be if they were part of
a party platform.
76
Although the populist justifications for direct legislation have been
attacked on theoretical grounds, experience with ballot processes has led
several political analysts to accept a more moderate position. Professors
Bone and Benedict have concluded that the State of Washington's experi-
ence has been positive and that the "[i]nitiative and referendum provide
additional channels for political expression, linking the citizen to state
government."' 77 Professor Price closed his study by questioning "the pre-
vailing negative assessment of initiatives. 78 Professor Sirico believes
that the benefits outweigh the detriments and that referenda "offer a val-
uable safety valve to regulate the system's nondemocratic elements."'79
Mr. Magleby concludes that "[d]irect legislation has been neither as posi-
tive in its effect as proponents have frequently asserted nor as dire in its
consequences as opponents have predicted."80
The direct legislative device has both liberal and conservative sup-
porters.81 According to Professor Ranney's study of elections between
1945 and 1976, voters tend to take liberal positions on economic issues
and conservative positions on social issues.s2  "[T]he referendum is
neither an unfailing friend nor an implacable enemy of either left or
right."' 83 Mr. Magleby concedes that the referendum can be an effective
method of authoritatively resolving a policy dispute if the issue is funda-
mental and if all sides actively participate and accept the outcome.84
Professor Lee advocates a practical approach to analyzing the effec-
tiveness of the ballot processes: "The initiative and referendum must be
tested not against a theoretical model of democratic institutions but the
76. Id. at 189.
77. Bone & Benedict, supra note 42, at 349.
78. Price, supra note 10, at 262.
79. Sirico, supra note 17, at 646 n.75. Professor Joseph Zimmerman also advocates the
use of the permissive referendum as a safety valve at the municipal level. Zimmerman, Local
Representation: Designing a Fair System, 69 NAT'L Civic REV. 307, 311-12 (1980).
80. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 196; see also La Palombara & Hagan, Direct Legisla-
tion: An Appraisal and a Suggestion, 45 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 400, 421 (1951) ("prophecies of
the opponents have [not] been borne out").
81. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 190. For a good discussion of its use for liberal causes,
see L. TALLIAN, supra note 46.
82. Ranney, The United States ofAmerica, in REFERENDUMS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF PRACTICE AND THEORY, supra note 2, at 68, 85.
83. Id.
84. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 186. The example used was the question of whether
Great Britain should join the Common Market. See also Butler, supra note 2, at 76.
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real world of declining participation, weakened political parties, partisan
legislative districting, and television-dominated election campaigns
funded by massive contributions from special interests that also dominate
legislation lobbying. ... -85 Moreover, one commentator has noted that
"for most Americans issues of politics are not of central concern."' 86 As
Mr. Magleby observes:
The public is equally as ignorant about institutions as it is about issues.
Less than one-third of the adult population can explain the electoral
college, and generally only 50-60 percent of the adult population can
identify correctly which party has a majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives. In addition, less than 50 percent of the adult population
can recall the name of their congressman, and only 60 percent can
name even one of their U.S. senators.
87
Whatever the obstacles to rational, effective decision-making, they are
not unique to referendum processes, but plague the political system in
general.
Finally, recent polls indicate that a majority of the public favors
direct legislative devices 88 and that the trend is to expand, not to restrict
their use.89 A New Jersey poll suggests that voters realize that many
issues are too complicated to be decided simply by a yes or no vote, and
that, as voters, they lack the understanding necessary to make rational
choices.90 Nevertheless, the poll reveals that the great majority of citi-
zens believe that they should be able to vote directly on issues.91 Other
polls show that most people believe that ballot measures are more effec-
tive at influencing government than candidate elections.
92
Special Features of the Permissive Referendum
Some of the criticism of direct democracy in general is not fully
applicable to the permissive referendum. The permissive referendum
may be exercised only in response to measures drafted, debated, and
passed by a legislative body, which has had the opportunity to consider
the alternatives, the intensity of public demands, and the need for com-
promise. Once the legislature reaches an accommodation, the role of the
electorate in the permissive referendum is restricted to accepting or re-
jecting the compromise. Additionally, the important function of setting
85. Lee, supra note 4, at 58.
86. V. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 47 (1967).
87. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 127-28.
88. Lee, supra note 4, at 58.
89. Id.
90. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 8-9.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10.
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the agenda of policy issues is not left to interest groups, but remains in
the hands of the legislature or city council. This contrasts with the initia-
tive, which is drafted by interest groups that, without popular participa-
tion, set an agenda of their own issues. Popular vote may generate
controversy, but the people ultimately will benefit from the social conflict
when it inevitably wanes as new issues come to light.93 Thus, in some
situations, a popular vote may be a very effective method of reaching an
authoritative resolution of a policy issue.
Although the quality of state and local government recently has im-
proved,94 the ballot processes are far from obsolete. Dissatisfaction with
government and its decisions remains an important impetus for popular
participation in the political system. For example, observers of the 1978
Jarvis-Gann tax initiative in California 95 suggest that, in addition to ris-
ing residential property taxes, the tax revolt was also.the result of a pub-
lic perception of widespread governmental waste and the failure of state
government to provide property tax relief despite a state fiscal surplus.
96
Additionally, there is little, if any, evidence to suggest that the per-
missive referendum is likely to be exercised recklessly by the electorate.
97
The process has been invoked on relatively few occasions and generally
has involved important and timely issues.98 Several factors contribute to
the infrequent use, including the heavy burden of soliciting sufficient sig-
natures within a limited time, the reluctance of legislators to pass meas-
ures that may provoke opposition,99 and greater satisfaction with the
measures enacted by legislators. 1°° Thus, the permissive referendum
may, indirectly and in a limited way, advance reformist goals by enhanc-
ing legislative accountability.
Research in the State of Washington supports the conclusion that
93. See L. COSER, THE FUNTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956).
94. See Nice, Revitalizing the States: A Look at the Record, 72 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 371
(1983); Reeves, Look Again at State Capacity: The Old Gray Mare Ain't What She Used To Be,
16 AM. REV. PUB. AD. 74 (1982).
95. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
96. Citrin & Levy, From 13 to 4 and Beyond: The Political Meaning of the Ongoing Tax
Revolt in California, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT: THE CASE OF PROPOSITION 13, at 1, 6-
7 (G. Kaufman & K. Rosen eds. 1981). For a summary of the causes of the tax revolt, see
Sigelman, Lowery & Smith, The Tax Revolt: A Comparative State Analysis, 36 W. POL. Q. 30
(1983).
97. Nor has the fear that the initiative would be used to enact statutes detrimental to
property interests been borne out in practice. Bone & Benedict, supra note 42, at 348.
98. A review of statewide measures referred by petition since 1960, see supra note 31,
reveals that referenda have concerned taxes, reapportionment, obscenity, alcohol control, voter
registration, and open housing.
99. Price, supra note 10, at 245.
100. Bone & Benedict, supra note 42, at 338.
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the permissive referendum has not been exercised in an unreasonable
fashion; only twenty-eight petition referenda reached the ballot between
1914 and 1973.101 Referenda have been substantially more successful
than initiatives at qualifying for the ballot in Washington, with seventy-
seven percent of all referendum petitions qualifying as compared to
twenty-four percent of all initiatives over the same period of time.'
0 2
Summarizing the Washington experience, Professors Bone and Benedict
observed:
Although less used than the initiative, the referendum has been an im-
portant instrument of popular control. The electorate has defeated
some referred measures-especially governmental and technical ques-
tions which seemed in the overall interest. But numerous private bills
dubbed by many legislatures as "bad legislation" were also turned
down by the voters. During the last three decades the legislature has
seemed more reluctant to pass bills which might invite the mobiliza-
tion of a referendum effort.103
Because use of the permissive referendum has been so limited, the
device presents no serious danger of undermining the authority of the
legislature or of impairing its ability to function. In fact, research based
upon state initiative proposals discloses that the process has had little
impact on the degree of legislative innovation. 1° 4 Furthermore, those
states that have an initiative process are, surprisingly, far more likely
than noninitiative states to have a two-party system. 105
Finally, although these conclusions are based on experience with
statewide ballot measures, they probably are equally applicable to local
referenda. Differences in the size, composition, and volatility of local
electors may have either a positive or a negative influence on the efficacy
of the ballot as a decision-making device. Even with this caveat, there
appears to be little danger of the permissive referendum overriding the
traditional law-making processes.
Legislative Declarations of Emergency: The Rule of
Judicial Deference
One of the keys to analyzing the public safety exception is to disen-
tangle it from the conclusive emergency rule, which is a rule of construc-
tion for determining the effective date of legislation in cases of
emergency. Although the conclusive emergency rule differs from the
101. Id. at 337.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 348.
104. Price, supra note 10, at 258-62.
105. Id. at 255.
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public safety exception both in purpose and effect, many courts have ap-
plied the rule in construing public safety exceptions to permissive refer-
enda. Application of the conclusive emergency rule has exerted a
conservative influence on the interpretation of public safety clauses, effec-
tively placing them beyond the reach of judicial review. In order to un-
derstand the relationship between the conclusive emergency rule and the
public safety exception, this section presents a brief summary of the con-
clusive emergency rule and its origin.
At common law, an enactment of Parliament was deemed effective
as of the first day of the session during which the measure was
adopted.1 0 6 Palpable evils arising from this retroactive application of leg-
islation10 7 led Parliament in 1793 to provide that an act was effective on
the date it received royal assent, unless otherwise provided in the act.108
In the United States, the rule against retroactive legislation was elevated
to a constitutional limitation on legislative power at the state and federal
levels. 109 Consequently, with few exceptions, an act of Congress takes
effect on the date of its passage, absent an express contrary provision.110
The effective date of a state statute usually depends upon either an
express constitutional provision or a statutory effective date. Most states
delay effectiveness for sixty or ninety days following the adjournment of
the legislative assembly or until a certain date following the adjourn-
ment. I 1 Many jurisdictions prescribe a similar waiting period for mu-
nicipal ordinances.' 12 The delay between the passage of a law and its
effective date offers the public the opportunity to inform itself of the new
106. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 222 (7th ed.
1903).
107. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurispru-
dence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 779-80 (1936). Blackstone observed that "[a]ll laws should be
therefore made to commence infuturo, and be notified before their commencement .... 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.
108. An Act to Prevent Acts of Parliament From Taking Effect From Time Prior to the
Passing Thereof, 33 Geo. 3, ch. 13 (1793).
109. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 397 (1798); Smead, supra note 107, at 780-
81.
110. Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164, 211 (1822); United States v. Gavrilovic,
551 F.2d 1099, 1103 (8th Cir. 1977); see also J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 104, at 124 (1st ed. 1891) ("When no other time is fixed a statute takes effect
from the date of its passage-from the date of the last act necessary to complete the process of
legislation and to give a bill the force of law." (footnote omitted)).
111. Typical effective dates are June 1 or July 1. For a list of the effective dates in various
states, see 2 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 110, § 33.02, at 2 n. 1 (4th ed. 1973).
112. 5 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15.39, at 110 (3d ed.
1981).
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law and to alter its behavior accordingly.
1 3
Most state constitutions provide that, when emergency action must
be taken, the legislature may circumvent the grace period and declare the
law effective immediately upon its passage. Some state assemblies pos-
sess this power without limitation." 14 Other constitutions, however, pro-
vide that acts are effective immediately only upon a legislative
declaration of emergency. 1 5 For example, the Illinois Constitution of
1848 postponed the effective date of a statute "unless in case of emer-
gency the general assembly shall otherwise direct."'"1 6 The early consti-
tutions of Nebraska, 17 Oregon,11 8 and South Dakota' 19 had similar
provisions.
20
Although an emergency has been defined as "an unforeseen combi-
nation of circumstances which calls for immediate action,"' 21 courts
have held that the purpose of the clause is only to determine when the act
takes effect 122 and have demanded no more than a legislative finding of
convenience. 123 Moreover, courts traditionally have left this matter
solely in the hands of the enacting body and generally have refused to
113. Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361, 362 (1855); Price v. Hopkins, 13 Mich. 318, 325
(1865); City of Roanoke v. Elliot, 123 Va. 393, 401, 96 S.E. 819, 822 (1918).
114. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 19; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 19; MIss. CONST. art IV,
§ 75.
115. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 22; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 28; S.D. CONsT. art. III,
§ 22. Failure to include the clause in the statute will nullify its expedited effective date, V-1 Oil
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Idaho 140, 143, 559 P.2d 756, 759 (1977), and a void emergency
declaration simply postpones the effective date to that of any other nonemergency measure.
Cf McIntosh v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 134, 137, 120 S.W. 455, 457 (1909) (no error in passing
an act by less than four-fifths of legislature under an emergency clause because enforcement
did not occur until 90 days after adjournment of the legislature).
116. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 23.
117. NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. III, § 27.
118. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 28.
119. S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 22.
120. For a complete listing of such constitutional provisions, see Emergency Legislation,
supra note 36, at 851 & nn.5-11.
121. Garvey v. Trew, 64 Ariz. 342, 354, 170 P.2d 845, 853, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 784
(1946); Hatfield v. Meers, 402 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Culhane v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 65 S.D. 337, 342, 274 N.W. 315, 318 (1937); State ex rel. Gray v. Martin, 29
Wash. 2d 799, 806, 189 P.2d 637, 641 (1948). An emergency doctrine is recognized in many
other areas of the law. E.g., Ingalls Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Holcomb, 217 So. 2d 18, 20-21 (Miss.
1968) (emergency medical exception to workers' compensation statute); Perez v. State, 514
S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (warrantless search due to exigent circumstances);
Roberts v. Knorr, 260 Wis. 288, 291, 50 N.W.2d 374, 376 (1951) (inaction of innocent driver
excused by sudden emergency).
122. Barber v. State, 206 Ark. 187, 190, 174 S.W.2d 545, 546 (1943); Huntsville Indep.
School Dist. v. McAdams, 217 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 148
Tex. 120, 221 S.W.2d 546 (1949).
123. See infra note 138.
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overturn a legislative declaration of emergency.124 In Biggs v. Mc-
Bride,1 25 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court held that
it is for the legislature to ascertain and declare the fact of the existence
of the emergency, and its determination is not reviewable elsewhere.
The constitution has vested the law-making department of the govern-
ment with the power to determine that question ... , and such deter-
mination is not made reviewable in the courts.
126
Although the Biggs court did require the assembly to make some
statement of emergency circumstances in the act, it held that the legisla-
tive declaration that the proposed act "would greatly tend to benefit the
people of this state" was sufficient.
127
Biggs illustrates the application of the conclusive emergency rule.
The rule manifests judicial deference to the legislature's decision to expe-
dite the effective dates of statutes merely as a matter of convenience
1 28
rather than in response to true emergency circumstances. This rule may
be compelled by specific language in a state constitution that confers
upon the legislative branch the authority to accelerate a statute's effective
date by "directing" or "declaring" the existence of an emergency. There
is considerable merit to such a rule.129 A body with the power to enact a
124. See Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 IlM. 361, 362-63 (1855); Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7
Blackf. 415, 416 (Ind. 1845). Indeed, a legal encyclopedia of the time stated that "the legisla-
ture is the sole judge as to whether an emergency exists, and its declaration is not open to
question by the courts." 36 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1193-94 (1910).
125. 17 Or. 640, 21 P. 878 (1889). The Biggs case is of special note because the Oregon
Supreme Court relied on it in the seminal public safety exception case of Kadderly v. Portland,
44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903). The Oregon Constitution provided that acts take effect 90 days
after the end of the session, "except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared
in the preamble, or in the body of the law." OR. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 28. The act at
issue established the office and salary for railroad commissioners. A state officer refused to pay
the commissioners' salaries on the grounds that no emergency was declared in the body of the
act and thus it was not immediately effective. Biggs, 17 Or. at 643, 21 P. at 879. The court was
skeptical of the legislature's "emergency" delcaration, id. at 647, 21 P. at 880, but refused to
consider its merits.
126. Biggs, 17 Or. at 647, 21 P. at 880.
127. Id. The court justified its holding by noting the limits of judicial authority: "Such
determination is in its nature political, and not judicial, and for such errors, if they be errors,
the remedy must be found in the virtue and intelligence of the people. The ballot-box is the
medium through which they may be corrected." Id. at 647-48, 21 P. at 880.
128. See Molesworth v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 47, 51, 196 N.E.2d
312, 315 (1964) ("The term 'emergency,' under the Massachusetts constitutional provision,
thus has a somewhat artificial and unnatural meaning, for most members of the public proba-
bly would not regard the needs of mere 'public convenience' as giving rise to a true 'emer-
gency.' "); Prescott v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 299 Mass. 191, 200, 12 N.E.2d 462,
467 (1938) ("[N]ecessities of 'public ... convenience' ... justify a declaration of an emergency
[Tihe Legislature [must] have wide discretion in declaring the existence of an
emergency.").
129. The conclusive emergency rule remains intact in several nonreferenda jurisdictions at
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law should possess the concomitant power to direct when that law takes
effect. I30 The rule removes the possibility of confusion regarding the ef-
fective date of a statute, which contributes to the certainty of law and
conserves judicial resources that would otherwise be expended in litigat-
ing that issue. Finally, the effective date of a statute is essentially a ques-
tion of legislative procedure, and courts generally have declined to




both the state level, e.g., Diaz Cintron v. Puerto Rico, 24 F.2d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1928); Hill v.
Taylor, 264 Ky. 708, 716-17, 95 S.W.2d 566, 570 (1936); Breckinbridge v. County School Bd..
146 Va. 1, 4, 135 S.E. 693, 694-95 (1926), and the local level, e.g., State ex rel. Skillman v. City
of Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 589, 134 So. 541, 543 (1931); Breland v. City of Bogalusa, 51 So. 2d
342, 345 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Artcarved Class Rings, Inc. v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.2d 788,
791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
130. Some states require a two-thirds vote of all the members to pass an emergency mea-
sure. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8; ME. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 3, § 16; MO. CONST. art. III, § 29; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 41;
OHIO CONST. art. II, § ld; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 58; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 22; TEX.
CONST. art. III, § 39; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 31; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30; see also MD.
CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (three-fifths vote); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (four-fifths vote).
Some of the apparent capriciousness of the rule is ameliorated by requiring the consent of
a super-majority of the legislature and a statement of the reasons for the emergency declara-
tion. Some states require that the emergency be expressed or declared in the preamble or the
body of the act. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 22; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 28; N.D. CONST.
art. IV, § 41; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 28; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 22; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 39;
VA. CONST. art. IV, § 13. Others require a statement of facts supporting the declaration. E.g..
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16;
OHIO CONsT. art. II, § ld; see also McCray v. City of Boulder, 165 Colo. 383, 386-87, 439
P.2d 350, 352-53 (1968) (city charter requires statement in city ordinance). Although courts
agree that one of the purposes of a statement is to restrain legislative abuse of emergency
declarations, see Gentry v. Harrison, 194 Ark. 916, 920-21, 110 S.W.2d 497, 501 (1937) (Prior
to amending the Arkansas Constitution to require a statement, the emergency clause was at-
tached to almost all laws enacted.); Graham v. Dye, 308 Ill. 283, 287, 139 N.E. 390, 391 (1923)
(An emergency statute must contain a statement because Illinois Constitution does not author-
ize passage of an emergency statute unless the immediate enactment is important, if not neces-
sary, to accomplish its purpose.); Payne v. Graham, 118 Me. 251, 255, 107 A. 709, 710 (1919)
(constitutional requirement of emergency statement creates a limitation on legislative power);
Goodman v. Youngstown, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 696, 702 (1937) ("The mere statement that the
ordinance is necessary ... is but a conclusion of the council."), the statement, once made, is
rather perfunctory. See Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 91-92, 83 A.2d 556, 563 (1951) (Ultimate
facts, such as that existing revenue of the state was insufficient to meet needs of the state, were
sufficient.); Molesworth v. Secretaiy of the Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 47, 59, 196 N.E.2d 312,
320 (1964) (statement that delay in effective date would tend to defeat purpose of act held
sufficient); Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 183, 248 P.2d 324, 335 (1952) ("[P]rotracted narra-
tion of factual detail" is not required.).
131. When a bill is passed in the appropriate form by both houses of the legislature and is
signed by the presiding officer of each house, it is referred to as an enrolled bill, I J. SUTHER-
LAND, supra note 110, § 15.01, at 407, and becomes law upon receiving the assent of the
governor. Id. § 16.02, at 434. If an enrolled bill has no defects on its face with respect to its
enactment, a substantial number of courts refuse to consider extrinsic evidence to prove that
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The conclusive emergency rule already was firmly in place when the
Progressive movement swept across the nation and brought the permis-
sive referendum amendments to many state constitutions. These amend-
ments were limited to acts other than those necessary for the immediate
preservation of public peace, health, or safety. Although the public
safety exception appeared to address crises and disasters, it was not clear
whether courts would construe public safety exceptions with the same
deference accorded to emergency declarations. The older conclusive
emergency clause had virtually no limits and surely was not restricted in
practice to actual emergencies. Would courts protect the referendum
process from legislative encroachment by strictly construing public safety
declarations? Little time elapsed before the first courts wrestled with the
issue and set the tone for the exercise of permissive referendum powers
for the remainder of the century. 132
Early Judicial Responses to the Public Safety Exception
The Kadderly Rule
The first state to adopt the permissive referendum in its constitution
was South Dakota in 1898.133 The constitutional amendment excepted
laws "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
the bill was not lawfully enacted. Id. § 15.03, at 410; see Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y v.
Green, 288 A.2d 273 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); State ex reL Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wash. 2d 834,
840-41, 232 P.2d 833, 836-37 (1951). For example, several courts have refused to question a
suspension by the legislature of a rule requiring the reading of a bill on three separate days.
People ex rel. Scearce v. County of Glenn, 100 Cal. 419, 421-22, 35 P. 302, 303 (1893); Wey-
and v. Stover, 35 Kan. 545, 551-52, 11 P. 355, 359 (1886); Hall v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503, 506-07
(1876); Day Land & Cattle Co. v. Texas, 68 Tex. 526, 543 (1867). Courts defend this rule on
the same grounds used to justify conclusive emergency declarations:
[T]he evils attending uncertainty in ascertaining the statutory laws of the state would
far out-weigh any benefits which might be obtained by permitting an impeachment of
the authentication of an act. If the members of the General Assembly violate their
constitutional duties on adjournment, they can be defeated the next time such offices
come up for election, but the remedy is not with the courts.
State ex rel. Cline v. Schricker, 228 Ind. 41, 48, 88 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (1949). Courts that do
consider extrinsic evidence limit the inquiry to those cases in which it affirmatively appears in
the journal records that the procedural requirements have not been met, I J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 110, § 15.04, at 414, or to those cases in which the presumption of validity is over-
come by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 15.06, at 416; see D & W Auto Supply v. De-
partment of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 424-25 (Ky. 1980).
132. Part of the problem has been one of semantics, with courts using the term "emer-
gency" to describe both an effective date clause and an act immediately necessary for public
welfare. The leading case that is favorable to the referendum makes this mistake. State ex rel.
Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 318, 147 P. 11, 16-17 (1915).
133. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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health or safety .... ,"134 It also left undisturbed the state constitution's
emergency legislation provision. 135 The permissive referendum amend-
ment made no reference to emergency acts or to the legislative authority
to declare them. 36 Following South Dakota, Utah 37 and Oregon
38
adopted the ballot process in 1900 and 1902, respectively. The Oregon
amendment included a public safety exception expressed in the same lan-
guage as the South Dakota provision: "The second power is the referen-
dum, and it may be ordered (except as to laws necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety), either by
petitions signed by 5% of the legal voters, or by the legislative assembly,
as other bills are enacted."'139 As in the case of South Dakota, the Ore-
gon amendment did not change the emergency provision of the Oregon
Constitution, which provided that statutes become effective ninety days
after the end of the session, absent an emergency declaration.
40
The emergency clauses thus conflicted with the public safety clauses
in both constitutions. '4' In both the Oregon and South Dakota amend-
ments, the public safety exception restricts the referendum power with-
out stating which branch of government is vested with the authority to
determine whether an act is immediately necessary for public welfare, or
how the power shall be exercised. The older emergency provision, on the
other hand, vested the power in the legislature to be exercised by "declar-
ing" an emergency 42 or by "directing" an expedited effective date. 143 In
South Dakota, a two-thirds vote of the assembly is required to declare an
134. Id.
135. It provides that statutes go into effect 90 days after the end of the legislative session,
"unless in case of emergency, (to be expressed in the preamble or body of the act) the Legisla-
ture shall by a vote of two-thirds ... otherwise direct." Id. § 22.
136. Id. § 1.
137. The Utah Constitution of 1895 provided for a 60-day waiting period unless the legis-
lature directed otherwise by two-thirds vote. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. VI, § 25. No decla-
ration of emergency was required. By the terms of the amendment of 1900, the referendum
may be exercised against any measure that is not adopted by a two-thirds majority. UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 1. In short, Utah has adopted a legislative referendum.
138. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
139. Id.
140. The provision states that "[n]o act shall take effect, until ninety days from the end of
the session ... except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared in the pream-
ble, or in the body of the law." Id. § 28.
141. In South Dakota, the clauses are harmonized insofar as the deadline for filing a refer-
endum petition-90 days after the end of the legislative session, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 2-1-4 (1980)--corresponds to the effective date of the act under the state constitution. S.D.
CONST. art. III, § 22. The Oregon amendment also prescribes a 90-day deadline that matches
the effective date clause. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 28.
142. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 28.
143. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 22.
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emergency,144 but the amendment is silent with respect to the number of
votes required to pass a public safety measure. 145
Before another state joined the ranks, 146 the South Dakota Supreme
Court, in State ex rel. Lavin v. Bacon, 47 and the Oregon Supreme Court,
in Kadderly v. Portland,14 8 had the opportunity to reconcile the conflict
between the two provisions. Lavin was an action in quo warranto to
determine title to membership on a state board of charities and correc-
tions in view of a 1901 act that contained a hybrid public safety and
emergency declaration 149 and had the effect of ousting the existing mem-
bership in favor of a newly appointed board. In Kadderly, the dispute
arose when the city council of Portland authorized the reassessment of
plaintiff's land to determine his proportionate share of the cost of street
improvements. The reassessment was made pursuant to a state statute
that had become immediately effective under an emergency clause.'
50
In Lavin and Kadderly the complaining parties sought to have the
statute in question declared invalid on the ground that it was not neces-
sary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety
under the terms of the referendum amendment and thus could not take
effect immediately.' 51 Neither case, however, presented a confrontation
between the legislative determination of public safety and the people's
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1.
146. Nevada was the next state to adopt a public safety exception in 1904, after the amend-
ment passed the legislature in 1901 and 1903. 1901 Nev. Stat. 139 (codified at NEv. CONST.
art. XIX, § 1).
147. 14 S.D. 394, 85 N.W. 605 (1901).
148. 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903).
149. Section 3 of the act provided:
Whereas, there is no law limiting the term of office of appointees ... the enact-
ment of the foregoing provision is necessary for the immediate preservation and sup-
port of the existing public institutions of this state, and an emergency is hereby
declared to exist and this act shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its
passage and approval.
Lavin, 14 S.D. at 400, 85 N.W. at 606.
150. Section 427 of the act provided in part:
Whereas there are several bridges upon important thoroughfares and car lines in
the City of Portland, now old and in a dilapidated and ruinous condition, dangerous
to life and property; and whereas there is an immediate necessity for the construction
of new bridges in the place of said old ones, in order to provide for the safety of the
people of said city ... and whereas there is otherwise a necessity for the immediate
adoption of the foregoing act to insure the health, peace, and safety of the people of
Portland, therefore, this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its ap-
proval by the Governor.
Kadderly, 44 Or. at 123-24, 74 P. at 712.
151. Id. at 128-29, 74 P. at 714; Lavin, 14 S.D. at 400, 85 N.W. at 606.
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exercise or attempted exercise of the referendum. Rather, the central
issue in both cases was the effective date of the statute.
Neither court took the opportunity to second-guess the legislative
determination. Each applied the old conclusive emergency rule, recast in
terms of public safety, and held that the question of whether a law is in
fact necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or
safety is for the legislature alone to judge and its determination is conclu-
sive and final. 152 An oft-quoted passage from the Kadderly opinion
rationalizes the results:
But, it is argued, what remedy will the people have if the legisla-
ture, either intentionally or through mistake, declares falsely or errone-
ously that a given law is necessary for the purposes stated? The
obvious answer is that the power has been vested in that body, and its
decision can no more be questioned or reviewed than the decision of
the highest court in a case over which it has jurisdiction. Nor should it
be supposed that the legislature will disregard its duty, or fail to ob-
serve the mandates of the constitution. The courts have no more right
to distrust the legislature than it has to distrust the courts. The consti-
tution has wisely divided the government into three separate and dis-
tinct departments, and has provided that no person charged with
official duties under one of these departments shall exercise any of the
functions of another, except as in the constitution expressly provided
.... It is true that power of any kind may be abused when in unwor-
thy hands. That, however, would not be a sufficient reason for one
coordinate branch of the government to assign for attempting to limit
the power and authority of another department. If either of the de-
partments, in the exercise of the powers vested in it, should exercise
them erroneously or wrongfully, the remedy is with the people, and
must be found, as said by Mr. Justice Strahan in Biggs v. McBride, ...
in the ballot box.
153
A conclusive declaration is tantamount to granting the legislature
the power to prevent a referendum merely by inserting an emergency
declaration, regardless of whether an actual crisis exists. The impact of
this construction cannot be over-emphasized. Two recent cases, both in-
volving municipal ordinances, illustrate the point. In an Oklahoma deci-
sion, 1 54 plaintiffs challenged a referendum petition directed at an
ordinance closing a public street on the ground that the ordinance con-
tained an emergency clause.' 55 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
the determination of an emergency was exclusively a legislative function
and conclusive in judicial proceedings, and therefore the challenged ordi-
152. Kadderly, 44 Or. at 149-50, 74 P. at 721; Lavin, 14 S.D. at 405, 85 N.W. at 608.
153. Kadderly, 44 Or. at 150, 74 P. at 721 (citation omitted).
154. In re Supreme Court Referendum Petition, 530 P.2d 120, 121 (Okla. 1974).
155. Id.
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nance was not subject to the referendum process. 156 Similarly, the Ohio
Supreme Court applied the conclusive rule to a public safety declaration
in an ordinance authorizing the construction of a sewage disposal sys-
tem.1 57 After citizens petitioned for the referral of the measure, the gov-
erning council repealed the ordinance and enacted a new one with the
same language plus a public safety declaration. Citing the conclusive
rule, the court refused to review the declaration.
158
156. Id. at 121.
157. State ex reL Tester v. Board of Elections, 174 Ohio St. 15, 17, 185 N.E.2d 762, 763
(1962).
158. Id. at 17, 185 N.E.2d at 763; see also State v. Kizak, 15 Ohio St. 2d 27, 28-29, 238
N.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1968) (ordinance reciting that immediate municipal income tax was nec-
essary to generate revenue complied with statutory requirement that reasons for emergency be
set forth). In addition to Oregon, the states of Arizona, Colorado, Ohio, and Oklahoma will
not review a finding of public safety even though a referendum is at stake.
For cases following the Kadderly rule in Oregon, see Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 166,
248 P.2d 324, 328 (1952); Roy v. Beveridge, 125 Or. 92, 96-97, 266 P. 230, 232 (1928); Cam-
eron v. Stevens, 121 Or. 538, 544, 256 P. 395, 397 (1927); Thielke v. Albee, 79 Or. 48, 53, 153
P. 793, 795 (1915); Bennett Trust Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Or. 333, 343, 113 P. 863, 867 (1911).
But see Joplin v. Ten Brook, 124 Or. 36, 40, 263 P. 893, 895 (1928) (declaration struck down
as obviously false).
Arizona cases include: City of Phoenix v. Landrum & Mills Realty, 71 Ariz. 382, 387,
227 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (1951); Orme v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 25 Ariz. 324,
347-48, 217 P. 935, 943 (1923).
Colorado cases include: Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 216, 229, 533 P.2d 1129,
1137 (1975) (en banc); Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 31, 218 P. 913, 915 (1923);
Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 27, 31, 156 P. 1108, 1110-11 (1916) (en banc); In re Senate
Resolution No. 4, 54 Colo. 262, 270-71, 130 P. 333, 336 (1913) (per curiam).
Ohio cases include: State ex reL City of Fostoria v. King, 154 Ohio St. 213, 220-21, 94
N.E.2d 697, 701 (1950); State ex reL Schorr v. Kennedy, 132 Ohio St. 510, 517, 9 N.E.2d 278,
280-81 (1937); State ex reL Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 604-06, 133 N.E. 457, 460-61
(1921). But see Walsh v. Cincinnati City Council, 54 Ohio App. 2d 107, 111-12, 375 N.E.2d
811, 814-15 (1977) (striking down obviously illusory declaration in city ordinance).
For Oklahoma cases, see In re Supreme Court Referendum Petition, 530 P.2d 120, 121
(Okla. 1974); In re Referendum Petition No. 1, 182 Okla. 419, 422, 77 P.2d 1152, 1154-55
(1938); In re Menefee, 3 Okla. 365, 375, 97 P. 1014, 1018 (1908); Oklahoma City v. Shields, 3
Okla. 265, 303, 100 P. 559, 576 (1908). But see Riley v. Carico, 27 Okla. 33, 37, 110 P. 738,
740 (1910) (An act that puts a 10-year lien on land cannot be put into immediate effect.).
Arkansas also followed the Kadderly rule prior to joining the ranks of those states that
subject public safety legislation to the permissive referendum without suspending the act pend-
ing the election. See Hanson v. Hodges, 109 Ark. 479, 490, 160 S.W. 392, 395 (1913); Arkan-
sas Tax Comm'n v. Moore, 103 Ark. 48, 54, 145 S.W. 199, 202 (1912).
California, Maine, and South Dakota allow only limited review of legislative declarations
of public safety in referendum cases. See, e.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 2d 412,
422, 84 P.2d 1034, 1040 (1938); Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal.
App. 2d 687, 691-92, 6 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385-86 (1960); Hollister v. Kingsbury, 129 Cal. App.
420, 424-25, 18 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1933); Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 98, 83 A.2d 556, 561
(1951); Hodges v. Snyder, 43 S.D. 166, 175, 178 N.W. 575, 577-78 (1920).
Prior to joining the nine states subjecting public safety acts to the permissive referendum
without suspending the act pending the election, Michigan and Montana followed the Brislawn
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The Brislawn Rule
While Kadderly159 and its progeny articulate the majority rule
among those states considering the issue, several cases recognize the dis-
tinction between emergency clauses for the purpose of making an act
immediately effective and declarations of public safety intended to insu-
late the act from the referendum. The leading case is State ex rel. Bris-
lawn v. Meath,160 decided twelve years after Kadderly and three years
after the State of Washington adopted the initiative and referendum in
1912. Brislawn reached a different result even though, like Lavin 161 and
Kadderly, it was an effective date case and not a referendum case. In
Brislawn, the parties sought to determine who had the right to member-
ship on a state board of land commissioners under a legislative act that
ousted one group of members and substituted another. The act further
provided that it was "necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace and safety and the support of the state government, and
shall take effect immediately."
162
The Brislawn court reasoned that the public safety exception for
permissive referenda had greater legal significance than the legislative
prerogative regarding the effective date of a law.' 63 In the majority's
view, the latter constitutional provision had been emasculated by judicial
construction and "was, in legal effect ... as barren as if no words had
been written after the section number."1 64 The referendum exception, on
the other hand, "fixed a limit beyond which the legislature [could not] go
without doing violence to the will and voice of the people."'' 65 Thus, the
rule. State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 318, 147 P. 11, 16-17 (1915); see Attorney
General ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524, 539, 145 N.W. 98, 103 (1914); State ex rel.
Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 165, 187 P. 641, 648 (1920).
159. Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903); see supra notes 148-53 & accom-
panying text.
160. 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915).
161. State ex rel. Lavin v. Bacon, 14 S.D. 394, 85 N.W. 605 (1901); see supra notes 147-52
& accompanying text.
162. Brislawn, 84 Wash. at 304, 147 P. at 12.
163. At the outset of the opinion, Judge Chadwick compared the Kadderly rule with the
established doctrine that courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional:
There has been a wide inconsistency in the holding of the courts upon constitu-
tional questions. They have declared that, where the legislature has said there is an
emergency, although undefined, its declaration is final and conclusive upon all. At
the same time, and in the same day, they have not hesitated to declare acts of the
legislature to be in derogation of the fundamental law or some of the legislative limi-
tations of the constitution,
Id. at 307, 147 P. at 13.




court reasoned that the exception is a limitation of power that is subject
to judicial scrutiny. Because the act in question was "in truth and in
fact" 166 not necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace,
health, or safety, a closely divided court voided the public safety clause
and held that the act would take effect ninety days after the adjournment
of the legislature. 16
7
Courts adopting the Kadderly rule, said the majority, were "in step
with a tune that is dead."' 168 According to Brislawn, the rule should be
that
the referendum cannot be withheld by the legislature in any case ex-
cept it be where the act touches the immediate preservation of the pub-
lic peace, health, or safety, or the act is for the financial support of the
government and the public institutions of the state, that is, appropria-
tion bills. If the act be doubtful, the question of emergency. will be
treated as a legislative question, and the doubt resolved in favor of the
declaration of emergency made by the legislative body.
Emergency, in the sense of the present constitution, does not
mean expediency, convenience or best interest. There is no room for
construction or speculation. The declaration is equivalent to saying
that the referendum shall not be cut off in any case except in certain
enumerated instances, none of which now occur. 169
A majority of the Washington Supreme Court could not in good con-
science ignore the claims of the referendum right and the case thus
marked a retreat from earlier judicial deference.
A recent example of the application of the Brislawn rule is State ex
rel. Humiston v. Meyers.170 The Supreme Court of Washington granted a
writ of mandamus compelling a referendum against a statute enacted to
regulate the maintenance and operation of bingo and other forms of gam-
ing devices. The court was unconvinced that pinball machines, punch-
boards, bingo, and card rooms were an immediate threat to the
populace.' 71 The majority concluded that neither the act itself nor mat-
ters of which the court takes judicial notice "indicate a situation justify-
ing the inclusion of an emergency clause."' 172 The Brislawn rule remains
166. Id. at 306, 147 P. at 12.
167. Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18.
168. Id. at 319, 147 P. at 17.
169. Id. at 318, 147 P. at 16-17.
170. 61 Wash. 2d 772, 380 P.2d 735 (1963). For other Washington cases, see State ex rel.
Gray v. Martin, 29 Wash. 2d 799, 803, 189 P.2d 637, 639 (1948); State ex rel. Kennedy v.
Reeves, 22 Wash. 2d 677, 682, 157 P.2d 721, 723-24 (1945); State ex reL Satterthwaite v.
Hinkle, 152 Wash. 221, 225, 277 P. 837, 839 (1929).
171. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d at 780, 380 P.2d at 740.
172. Id. The courts of Missouri and New Mexico also will review a finding of public safety
and order a referendum if the measure fails to fall within the ambit of the exception. See Inter-
City Fire Protection Dist. v. Gambrell, 360 Mo. 924, 934, 231 S.W.2d 193, 199 (1950); Heinkel
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a viable alternative to Kadderly. The following section discusses which
of these approaches is more consistent with existing doctrine.
The Proper Role of the Judiciary in Construing the Public
Safety Exception
Before treading upon the "most delicate balance between the emer-
gent powers of the legislature and the people's right of referendum," 173 a
court must first determine whether the issue of a legislative public safety
declaration is beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. Although a court's
power to declare an enactment void because it conflicts with the written
constitution of the state is fundamental to American jurisprudence, 174
the reach of judicial power is not limitless. Courts generally have refused
to decide issues that are uniquely political and therefore unsuited for ju-
dicial resolution. The political question doctrine holds that certain deci-
sions of the legislative and executive branches of government are
nonjusticiable.175 Several theories have been posited to explain the origin
of the doctrine, its nature, its application, and to identify some guidelines
that control its use.176 In 1962, the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr177
set forth the factors to be considered in determining whether a given is-
sue is nonjusticiable. The Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 58, 70, 226 S.W.2d 1012, 1016-17 (1950); State ex rel. Pollock v.
Becker, 289 Mo. 660, 679-80, 233 S.W. 641, 649 (1921); State ex rel. Westhues v. Sullivan, 283
Mo. 546, 591, 224 S.W. 327, 338-39 (1920); Otto v. Buck, 61 N.M. 123, 127-28, 295 P.2d 1028,
1031-32 (1956); State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 235-36, 141 P.2d 192, 196-97
(1943); Todd v. Tierney, 38 N.M. 15, 24, 27 P.2d 991, 997 (1933).
173. State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 380 P.2d 735, 738 (1963).
174. See Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Brock) 20, 32 (1793). See generally Nelson, Chang-
ing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-
1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166 (1972) (tracing the history and development of the doctrine of
judicial review).
175. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 1983).
176. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962); Henkin, Is
There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Scharpf, Judicial Review and
the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
177. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[Vol. 37
PUBLIC SAFETY LEGISLATION
partments on one question. 178
At first blush, the political question doctrine appears applicable to
disputes concerning the constitutionality of legislative action barring the
referendum process. In fact, in those jurisdictions giving conclusive ef-
fect to legislative pronouncements of emergency, judicial deference is
often justified with several of the criteria listed in Baker.
The first factor enunciated by the Supreme Court in Baker-
whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate branch-seems to have played a significant role
in the much earlier Kadderly opinion. Courts that follow Kadderly con-
strue the public safety exception together with an emergency effective
date provision and interpret the former in light of the latter's textual
commitment to the legislative branch. The court in Kadderly noted that
the Constitution of Oregon... giving the legislative assembly power to
put any law into force upon approval by declaring an emergency, has
been modified by the amendment of 1902, so as to exclude from the
power to declare an emergency all laws except those necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. 179
By defining the public safety exception as a term that narrowed the scope
of the emergency declaration provision, the question of whether a legisla-
tive finding of public safety is subject to judicial review became
rhetorical.18 0
The political question doctrine also explains the second theme of the
Kadderly rule: whether a matter calls for a policy determination of a
kind clearly not for judicial discretion. "The laws excepted from the op-
eration of the amendment," according to the Kadderly opinion, "do not
depend alone upon their character, but upon the necessity for their enact-
ment in order to accomplish certain purposes." 8 1 The questions of expe-
diency and necessity are not properly judicial questions, but belong to the
body that passes upon those issues. As the Kadderly court noted, "Most
unquestionably, those who make the laws are required, in the process of
their enactment, to pass upon all questions of expediency and necessity
connected therewith, and must therefore determine whether a given law
is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and
safety."
18 2
Despite the initial attractiveness of the political question doctrine in
this setting, however, a closer look reveals that the public safety excep-
178. Id. at 217.
179. Kadderly, 44 Or. at 147, 74 P. at 720 (emphasis added).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 148, 74 P. at 720.
182. Id. at 148, 74 P. at 721.
March 1986]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tion is an appropriate subject for judicial adjudication. A court applying
the cardinal rules of constitutional construction to permissive referenda
must ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of both the draft-
ers of the provision and the voters who ratified it. 183 Although judicial
deference in the effective date context may be justified, the different pur-
pose underlying the public safety limitation commands a different result.
Contemporaneous statements of intent by the drafters of the public
safety exception are difficult to locate. One proponent at the turn of the
century did articulate his view of the purpose of the public safety
exception:
As a matter of fact, no law can have for its object the immediate pres-
ervation of the public peace, unless it be to prevent invasion, insurrec-
tion, or war; no law can have for its object the immediate preservation
of the public health, unless it be to prevent the introduction of some
plague or the spread of some contagious or infectious disease; and no
law can have for its object the immediate preservation of the public
safety unless it be to prevent riot or mob violence, or something calcu-
lated to bring about great destruction to life or property ....
The people of the state should have the right to avail themselves of
the referendum clause in the constitution in all cases except those clearly
intended to be embraced within the exceptions quoted.
1 84
The conspicuous absence of this rule from the analysis of the Kad-
derly opinion is deliberate. Such an analysis would steer a course clear of
the political question doctrine and support the notion that the safety ex-
ception is justiciable.
The Kadderly court, in construing the emergent effective date provi-
sion and the public safety exception provision as in pari materia, con-
cluded that the necessity for invoking the public safety exception should
also be determined by the legislature. Although this is a common rule of
construction, its application in this case is suspect because the limiting
language of the public safety exception is on its face clear and unambigu-
ous and was adopted for a wholly different end. 185 The difference in the
purposes of the two clauses is demonstrated by the failure to commit the
public safety exception textually to the judgment of the legislative
branch.18 6 If the proponents of the public safety exception had intended
to place the discretion for its exercise in the hands of the assembly, they
could have so provided with appropriate language. Such discretion,
183. Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 863, 616 P.2d 802, 806, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 824, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1980).
184. J. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 136-37 (emphasis added).
185. See State v. Di Carlo, 67 N.J. 321, 325, 338 A.2d 809, 811 (1975); J. SUTHERLAND,
supra note 110, §§ 51.01, .03.
186. See supra notes 136-45 & accompanying text.
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however, could not be vested rationally in the same body that the refer-
endum process seeks to control.18 7 It seems then that the public safety
restriction is intended to set off a special class of subject matter in which
the legislature, in the best interest of all the people, can operate free from
a referendum threat. The emergency effective date provision, on the
other hand, is simply a procedural device through which the legislative
assembly may expedite the effective date of the statute, rather than a
substantive limitation on power.
A question related to the justiciability issue is whether the limiting
language of the public safety exception is so broad that it does not afford
judicially discoverable standards under which a court may judge the con-
tours of the restriction. Professor Scharpf, however, summarily has dis-
missed this cognitive approach to the political question doctrine: "I am
at a loss to see how either the Common Law or American Constitutional
Law could have grown and flourished if the courts had been unable or
unwilling to perform the creative functions which this cognitive theory so
categorically disavows for them."1 88 Indeed, constitutional law is replete
with examples of creative innovations fashioned by courts to judge the
proper exercise of legislative power. In the area under consideration,
courts routinely have reviewed findings of emergency for the purpose of
exceeding a spending or taxation ceiling,189 calling a special meeting to
make additional appropriations,190 or abridging a requirement that a
government contract be subject to competitive bidding prior to award.1 91
As a general matter, it is a long-standing principle that courts will review
legislative exercise of the police power.1 92 The exercise of police power
expressly conditioned on a declaration of fact "may never possess valid-
187. Professor Henkin has observed that, even if such power is granted to the legislative
branch, textual commitment does not necessarily place the decision beyond judicial review:
courts "consider daily whether the political branches exercise power textually committed to
them with due respect for constitutional limitations or prohibitions." Henkin, supra note 176,
at 605 n.27.
188. Scharpf, supra note 176, at 555-56.
189. E.g., Burr v. City & County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. 508, 199 P. 1034 (1921)
(ordinance of Board of Supervisors declaring certain facts to constitute a great necessity not
conclusive as to the truth of the facts stated); Continental Constr. Co. v. City of Lawrence, 297
Mass. 513, 9 N.E.2d 550 (1937); Murphy v. Town of W. New York, 130 N.J.L. 341, 32 A.2d
850 (1943); Tobin v. Town Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933).
190. E.g., State ex rel. Kautz v. Board of Comm'rs, 204 Ind. 484, 184 N.E. 780 (1933).
191. E.g., Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 358, 291 P. 839,
844 (1930); Saunders v. Board of Educ., 59 N.E.2d 936, 941 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944); Bak v.
Jones County, 87 S.D. 468, 474, 210 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1973).
192. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 879-91 (1976) (discussing current state review standards with respect to
state regulation of business, criminal procedure, religion, environment, and life-styles). The
early Brislawn cases relied on Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), which decided the au-
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ity if an obvious and vital mistake has occurred in the truth of the decla-
ration .... ",193
The Kadderly court took steps to reconcile its holding with the fact
that courts will review the constitutionality of police measures. It de-
clared that the police power is limited and thus implied that the contours
of the police power are precise. The referendum exception, the court
noted, "is broader and includes all laws, of whatsoever kind.., whether
they impose restraints on persons and property, or come strictly within
the police powers, or not." 194 Presumably, in the Kadderly view, a court
cannot review such unbridled discretion.
The Kadderly approach is wrong for two reasons. First, it allows
the exception to swallow the rule. Only rarely, if ever, will legislation fall
outside the exception. Clearly, this is not consistent with the purpose
and philosophy of the permissive referendum. Second, the Kadderly
reading of the public safety exception as broader than the police power
runs counter to established principles. The police power is so compre-
hensive that it eludes definition.1 95 Yet, as already noted, courts regu-
larly scrutinize legislative action to determine if it falls within that power.
Even more common is judicial review of declarations of "emergency."
To accept the Kadderly doctrine is to take the power of the referendum
from the hands of the voters and subject its use to the whim of the
legislature.
thority of the state to prohibit the manufacture of alcohol under its police power. The opinion
states:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the
duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Id. at 661.
Since 1937, the Supreme Court has shifted its analysis from substantive due process to
equal protection standards. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981) (employing equal protection analysis with respect to economic regulations). See gener-
ally Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
193. First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 95, 277 N.W. 762, 768 (1938).
194. Kadderly, 44 Or. at 148, 74 P. at 720.
195. The police power has been defined broadly as the government's power to enact laws
to promote the general welfare of its citizens. Jack Lincoln Shops v. State Dry Cleaners' Bd.,
192 Okla. 251, 253, 135 P.2d 332, 335 (1943), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 208 (1944). One
court views the police power as greater in scope than the public safety exception. State ex rel.
Haynes v. District Court, 106 Mont. 470, 482-83, 78 P.2d 937, 944 (1938). Another views the
powers as coterminous. State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 243, 141 P.2d 192,
200 (1943); see also Attorney General ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524, 536, 145
N.W. 98, 102 (1914). Whether or not the public safety exception is similar in scope to the
police power, it should be an independent limitation on the ability of the legislature to en-
croach upon the referendum process.
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Such a result is particularly anomalous in light of the high value
courts have placed on direct democracy. The ballot proposition process
has been described as a fundamental right,196 a precious right, 197 a shib-
boleth of democracy,1 98 a demonstration of a devotion to democracy, 199
and a coequal with the elected assembly.
2°°
Thus, in the hierarchy of rights under state governments, the per-
missive referendum deserves nearly as much protection as the right to
vote itself. At the same time, disputes over the availability of the referen-
dum resemble conflicts between branches of government-the voters in
their legislative capacity clashing with the elected legislature. The judici-
ary intervenes in other interbranch disputes, however, and traditionally
has been a zealous protector of civil and political rights.201
In a referendum case, a court is called upon to referee conflicting
claims between two government institutions. Those claims involve the
exercise of civil rights that have concomitant political overtones. In de-
ciding such a case, it is not likely that a court will place its legitimacy at
greater risk than it does in any other case involving the exercise of consti-
tutional power.202 Nor, in the words of Justice Brennan, will it be "ex-
pressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government" or
196. McKee v. City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 530, 616 P.2d 969, 972 (1980).
197. Ortiz v. Board of Supervisors, 107 Cal. App. 3d 866, 870, 166 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103
(1980).
198. Walsh v. Cincinnati City Council, 54 Ohio App. 2d 107, 109, 375 N.E.2d 811, 813
(1977).
199. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
200. See cases cited supra note 18.
201. When important civil rights are at stake, the Supreme Court generally has adjudi-
cated the issues even though they touch upon political questions. Scharpf, supra note 176, at
584. Furthermore, the high court has not eschewed conflicting claims between departments of
the federal government or between the federal government and the states. Id. at 585.
202. A recent development in constitutional law is the growing inclination of state courts
to find protection for individual rights within the text of state constitutional provisions. See
generally Howard, supra note 192. Justice Brennan instructs that
state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of
the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 489,
491 (1977).
If one espouses the proposition that the right to refer legislation to the voters is an impor-
tant right both from the perspective of the individual and the community, then perhaps this
new dimension in state constitutional law will prompt a court to abandon legal fictions from a
different time and take the right seriously.
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their "political decisions already made. ' 20
3
The Kadderly doctrine does have the advantage of making certain
the effective date of any emergency measures. The availability of judicial
review could cast doubt on which effective date will be enforced-the one
normally provided in the absence of an emergency or the one declared by
the legislature. This factor was noted by Judge Hill of the Colorado
Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in Van Kleeck v. Ramer:2
°4
Other reasons which lead me to believe that [the legislature's dec-
laration of emergency] was not intended to be left as an open question
like the constitutionality of a law, [are] the consequences that might
follow the application of such a system. Certainty as to what the law is
and when it goes into effect, is always desirable. If, as is contended, the
declaration of the Legislature means nothing unless in fact true, which
can be decided by the courts, then everyone interested must, before it is
reached by the courts, decide for himself whether it is true or false, and
concerning things upon which there will always be diversity of
opinion....
... The same uncertainty would apply to every law of this nature
during the entire ninety days following the adjournment of every ses-
sion of the general assembly .... Other illustrations could be given,
but these are sufficient to convince me that had the legislature and the
people thus intended they would have said so in language which would
not be susceptible of a different, and, as I view it, a more rational
construction. 20 5
Certainty as to effective dates, however, may be more important
than certainty as to the availability of the referendum. Whether a law is
presently enforceable is of immediate concern to those who are poten-
tially subject to that law. Whether a law is subject to suspension by ref-
erendum is a concern only if there is significant opposition to the law,
and only if that opposition can gather sufficient signatures to effect a ref-
erendum. In those states that allow judicial review of the public safety
203. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Brislawn jurisdictions, in upholding judicial review, have
also addressed the concerns that were later central to Baker. "The courts have the right to
measure the law by the yard stick of the Constitution, and determine whether or not the law-
makers breached the Constitution in making the declaration." State ex rel. Westhues v. Sulli-
van, 283 Mo. 546, 589, 224 S.W. 327, 338 (1920). "In constitutional construction the rule
always obtains that the intent of the people is the intent to be ascertained and upheld. It is for
the courts to determine their intent, as expressed in the Constitution, and to construe acts of
the legislature with reference to it." Attorney General ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 178 Mich.
524, 532, 145 N.W. 98, 101 (1914). In Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 83 A.2d 556 (1951), the
court reasoned that the legislature decides whether a fact exists, but the court draws legal
conclusions from the facts, such as whether such facts constitute an emergency. Id. at 98-99,
83 A.2d at 561. In Otto v. Buck, 61 N.M. 123, 127, 295 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1956), the question
was termed one of "judicial fact."
204. 62 Colo. 4, 156 P. 1108 (1916).
205. Id. at 19-21, 156 P. at 1113-14 (Hill, J., concurring).
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exception, any accompanying uncertainty has not had noticeable adverse
effects. Case law in jurisdictions following Brislawn 20 6 does not disclose
an abnormal amount of appellate litigation concerning the effective date
of statutes or ordinances. 207 To the extent problems may occur, an
elected assembly or council may take steps to diminish their frequency by
attaching public safety declarations only to those acts that are clearly
urgent matters. The conclusive emergency rule20 8 simply encourages the
abuse of the clause. There is no reason that a court should not distin-
guish an effective date case from a referendum case and subject the for-
mer to a lesser degree of scrutiny than the latter. Such a two-tiered
scheme presently exists in New Mexico.
20 9
All legislation, whether at the state or local level, will suffer from
uncertainty in the face of speculation concerning its constitutionality.
210
This is a latent defect of a constitutional system and is not limited to
emergency effective dates or the referendum context. The question is
whether expediency and certainty should outweigh the right to refer leg-
islative acts. Convenience has not been deemed persuasive in other con-
206. State ex rel Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915). See discussion of the
Brislawn rule supra text accompanying notes 160-69.
207. E.g., Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the "re-
quired publication" was not satisfied and plaintiff stated cause of action for violation of due
process and equal protection because of arbitrary and capricious administrative action); United
States v. Gavrilovich, 551 F.2d 1099, 1103-05 (8th Cir. 1977) (rule promulgated without 30-
day notice invalidated for failure to show good cause); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin.,
531 F.2d 1071, 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (review of emergency rule regulating price of
petroleum), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412
F.2d 740, 744-45 (3d Cir 1969) (rule raising interest costs to natural gas producers invalidated
for failure to provide notice); Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D.
Cal. 1972) (rule redistributing Indian reservation property invalidated for failure to state suffi-
cient reasons to waive 30-day notice period).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 106-32.
209. Hughes v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 235-36, 141 P.2d 192, 196 (1943); Hutchens v.
Jackson, 37 N.M. 325, 337, 23 P.2d 355, 362 (1933).
210. There are several schools of thought concerning the legitimacy and scope of judicial
review of legislative acts under a written constitution. At one end of the spectrum are those
who assert that enactments should be judged solely by the language of the constitution. See
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). At the
other extreme are those who urge that a court must consider important social and historical
norms extrinsic to the constitution in judging legislation. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). Some occupy a middle ground identified as
the process-oriented theory. These scholars argue that a court should intervene when the act
in question violates an express provision of the constitution, discriminates against minorities,
or adversely skews access to the political process. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
101-04(1980). In any case, judicial review of a public safety declaration does not offend any of
these theories. It passes muster under the more restrictive position because an express provi-
sion of the constitution is at issue, and it comports with the process-oriented school because
access to the ballot box is a political right.
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texts21 and should not prevail here.
A Balancing Approach for Judicial Review
Once a court decides to review a legislative finding that an act is
necessary for public safety, it must solve the difficult problem of choosing
the appropriate standard of review by which to judge whether an act falls
within the public safety exception. The United States Supreme Court has
used differing standards of review to define the constitutional limits of
governmental power according to the nature and importance of the pro-
tected right. The least restrictive test is whether the regulation or prohi-
bition is reasonably related to any conceivable legitimate governmental
objective. Government decisions will pass muster under this test if there
is any rational basis for the legislation. The test is perfunctory and gener-
ally has been invoked to review economic regulations that do not impinge
on fundamental rights or suspect classes.212 At the other extreme, stat-
utes that impair fundamental rights or discriminate against a suspect
class must survive strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if they are nec-
essary to promote a compelling state interest. 213 Finally, in certain cases,
the Court has applied a middle standard of review, under which the
court engages in an independent and meaningful review of the statute or
regulation and strikes it down unless the statute bears a substantial rela-
tionship to an important governmental objective.
214
Standards of review under state constitutional doctrine closely par-
211. For example, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), a majority of the Supreme
Court rejected notions of expediency and certainty in holding that federal courts may review a
state criminal sentence as disproportionate under the eighth amendment. Chief Justice Burger
dissented, stating that "there is a real risk that this holding will flood the appellate courts with
cases in which equally arbitrary lines must be drawn." Id. at 315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
212. Actions of the government with respect to social security regulations, business regula-
tions, and zoning have been upheld under the rational basis test. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wil-
son, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (upheld reduced medicaid benefits to certain institutionalized
persons); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upheld state statute prohibit-
ing oil producers from owning service stations); County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977)
(upheld parking restrictions).
213. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (strict scrutiny test
suggested for legislation affecting certain rights); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Bates v. City
of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (freedom of association); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (sterilization of convicts).
214. An example is gender-based classifications. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See
generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Van Patten, The Enigma of the
ERA, 30 S.D.L. REV. 8, 14-22 (1984).
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allel those established by the United States Supreme Court.2 15 Economic
regulations are judged by the rational basis test,21 6 and sometimes by a
middle-level substantial relationship test,217 particularly under the equal
protection clause,218 while interference with fundamental rights must
survive strict scrutiny.
219
In those states that permit judicial review of the public safety excep-
tion, courts generally have adopted the rational basis test that is normally
applied to legislation passed under the police power. The declaration of
emergency will be upheld when the act "does reasonably provide for the
preservation of public peace, health, or safety. ' 22 0 Courts sometimes ap-
ply a lower standard of review to declarations of emergency and neces-
sity. These clauses are considered "conclusive and must be given effect
unless the declaration on its face is obviouslyfalse .... ,, 22 1 In selecting a
215. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1333-34 (1982).
216. E.g., Belk-James, Inc. v. Nuzum, 358 So. 2d 174, 175 (Fla. 1978); John R. Grubb,
Inc. v. Iowa Housing Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1977). But see Howard, supra note
192, at 882-91 (Some states continue to apply substantive due process concepts to economic
regulation.).
217. See, e.g., City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525, 527 (Ala. 1980)
(regulation of explosives invalid because a less restrictive alternative was available).
218. Casey's Gen. Stores v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 220 Neb. 242, 246, 369
N.W.2d 85, 88 (1985) (striking discriminatory regulation of liquor licenses under federal and
state equal protection clauses).
219. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131, 610 P.2d 436, 440,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542-43 (1980) (voided restriction that no more than five unrelated persons
could live in one dwelling within city limits); Murphy v. Pocatello School Dist., 94 Idaho 32,
38, 480 P.2d 878, 884 (1971) (struck down length of hair restrictions).
220. State ex rel. Hughes v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 237, 141 P.2d 192, 197 (1943).
221. State ex rel. Pennock v. Reeves, 27 Wash. 2d 739, 743-44, 179 P.2d 961, 963 (1947)
(emphasis added), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel Pennock v. Coe, 42 Wash. 2d 569,
257 P.2d 195 (1953); cf State ex reL Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 778, 380 P.2d 735,
737 (1963); State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash. 2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121, 125 (1961);
State ex rel. Pennock v. Coe, 42 Wash. 2d 569, 576, 257 P.2d 190, 195 (1953).
The "obviously false" standard has been adopted in several cases from various jurisdic-
tions. California: Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 2d 412, 422, 84 P.2d 1034, 1040
(1938) (must appear "clearly and affirmatively" that public necessity does not exist); Stock-
burger v. Jordan, 10 Cal. 2d 636, 642, 76 P.2d 671, 674 (1938) (quoted in Davis, 12 Cal. 2d at
422, 84 P.2d at 1040); Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal. App. 2d
687, 691, 6 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385 (1960) (no "clear and affirmative" showing that declaration was
incorrect); Holister v. Kingsbury, 129 Cal. App. 420, 425, 18 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1933) (legisla-
tive finding of emergency invalid only if "statement of facts is so clearly insufficient as to leave
no reasonable doubt that the urgency does not exist"); Illinois: Buck v. City of Danville, 350
Ill. App. 519, 527, 113 N.E.2d 186, 190 (1953) (legislative declaration is conclusive "absent
evidence to the contrary"); Oregon: Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 175, 248 P.2d 324, 332
(1952) (declaration of emergency invalid if false on its face); Joplin v. Ten Brook, 124 Or. 36,
40, 263 P. 893, 895 (1928) (court will invalidate measure when "apparent on the face" that no
emergency existed); Ohio: Walsh v. Cincinnati City Council, 54 Ohio App. 2d 107, 111, 375
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standard, courts take into consideration "the face of the act itself; the
history of the legislation, and contemporaneous declarations of the Legis-
lature . . . ; the evil to be remedied . .. ; and the natural or absurd
consequences of any particular interpretation .... "22 But these factors
are not themselves sufficient. The standard of review for the public safety
exception must reflect the relative importance of the referendum power
in our political system. Justice Stone, in a footnote to the Supreme
Court's United States v. Carolene Products22 3 opinion, suggests that dis-
criminatory access to political processes may compel strict judicial re-
view under the equal protection clause:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about the repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
224
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the question, it has sought to maintain the integrity of the political pro-
cess by recognizing the right to vote as a fundamental right2 2 5 and by
striking down, under strict standards of review, state poll taxes,
226
malapportioned legislative districts, 22 7 one-year residency requirements
for voting,228 and unreasonable filing deadlines for candidacy. 229
Is the permissive referendum of equal stature with these political
rights? The question cannot be answered definitively. While courts pay
homage to populist values,230 judicial decisions tend to demonstrate be-
N.E.2d 811, 814 (1977) (declaration invalid when "obviously illusory"); South Dakota:
Hodges v. Snyder, 43 S.D. 166, 176, 178 N.W. 575, 578 (1920) (declaration was an "absurd-
ity"). But see State ex rel. Lindstrom v. Goetz, 73 S.D. 633, 636, 47 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1951)
(issue of emergency is for the courts); City of Colome v. Von Seggern Bros., 56 S.D. 390, 393,
228 N.W. 800, 801 (1930) (measure invalid unless necessity shown); Johnson v. Jones, 48 S.D.
260, 263, 204 N.W. 15, 17 (1925) (emergency issue is for the courts); State ex rel. Richards v.
Whisman, 36 S.D. 260, 274, 154 N.W. 707, 712 (1915) (measures clearly not within emergency
exception will not be given emergency effect), appeal dismissed, 241 U.S. 643 (1916).
222. State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 167, 187 P. 641, 649 (1920).
223. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
224. Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added).
225. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
226. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
227. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556-57 (1964).
228. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
229. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
230. Most courts claim that the direct processes must be liberally construed to facilitate
the exercise of this power. E.g., Blocker v. Sewell, 189 Ark. 924, 928, 75 S.W.2d 658, 660
(1934) (initiative provision should be liberally construed to carry out the purposes intended);
Alexander v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 2d 816, 821, 260 P.2d 261, 263 (1953) (Initiatives and
referenda should be liberally construed.); City of Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 194 Colo. 192, 195,
571 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1977) (initiative and referendum to be liberally construed); Colorado
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lief that the direct-democracy processes are an aberration rather than
part of the mainstream of our political tradition.2 31 This may result
partly from the fact that the process tends to be repetitive. The oppo-
nents of a measure before the legislature or city council presumably have
had an opportunity to lobby for its defeat. Courts may hesitate to grant
the opponents' request for another bite at the apple by allowing referral
of the matter directly to the voters, particularly when the proponents
have mustered sufficient votes in the assembly, sometimes by a three-
fifths or two-thirds majority, to pass the measure as a public safety act.
A court that grants relief permits the opponents and the small percentage
of citizens who sign the petitions to circumvent the judgment of the
elected body charged with representing all of the public. As noted by the
Maine Supreme Court in Morris v. Goss,
232
[the] controversy is not merely whether or not we have a sales and use
tax in the State of Maine, but it involves the important principle of
whether our Constitution permits a small minority of citizens who are
dissatisfied with the form of taxation enacted by the Legislature to ab-
solutely paralyze State government.
233
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict234 applied a test of strict scrutiny with respect to the voting
franchise, not because of the subject matter of the election-school is-
sues-but because in that case the statute permitted some resident citi-
zens to participate in the election while excluding others.2 35 It was the
discriminatory distribution of the franchise that triggered strict scrutiny.
In the case of a public safety act, the vote is denied to all citizens, not to a
Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 1, 5, 495 P.2d 220, 221 (1972) ("[I]nitiative
provisions... must be liberally construed to effectuate purpose."); Chouteau County v. Gross-
man, 172 Mont. 373, 378, 563 P.2d 1125, 1128 (1977) ("[Ilnitiative and referendum provisions
... should be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people."); City Comm'n
of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Nichols, 75 N.M. 438, 443, 405 P.2d 924, 927 (1965) (initiative
and referendum laws liberally construed to effectuate policies behind them); State ex reL Car-
son v. Kozer, 108 Or. 550, 555, 217 P. 827, 829 (1923) (initiative and referendum laws liberally
construed to effectuate policies behind them); Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 259, 332 P.2d
977, 979 (1958) ("act authorizing initiative legislation shall receive a liberal construction").
231. The majority in State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 776-77, 380 P.2d
735, 738 (1963), points out that, historically, the court has been divided over the scope of the
public safety exception and that whether the notion that the process should receive a liberal
construction is "over-optimistic." Judicial skepticism surely underlies a holding that the clos-
ing of a street, In re Supreme Court Referendum Petition, 530 P.2d 120 (Okla. 1974), or the
improvement of a sewer system, State ex reL Tester v. Board of Elections, 174 Ohio St. 15, 185
N.E.2d 762 (1962), or outlawing punch cards, Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 248 P.2d 324
(1952), constitutes an emergency circumstance that supersedes the ballot option.
232. 147 Me. 89, 83 A.2d 556 (1951).
233. Id. at 108, 83 A.2d at 566.
234. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
235. Id. at 629.
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select few, and from that perspective, it should not command heightened
judicial attention.
The adoption of the permissive referendum in many jurisdictions,
however, signifies some positive judgment on its necessity and merit. The
public continues to view the referendum power as a significant means of
affecting governmental policy.236 The permissive referendum has func-
tioned infrequently but reasonably well, without suffering from many of
the abuses feared by opponents.2 37 Judicial hostility seems to be directed
primarily at the manner in which the process is triggered, rather than the
wisdom of submitting issues to the people.238
The value of the popular veto undoubtedly lies in the opportunity it
presents to the citizens of a community to participate directly in making
a decision that affects their affairs. Not all citizens will avail themselves
of the opportunity, nor will all be capable of casting a rational ballot, but
the opportunity to have a voice remains. Experience indicates that the
popular veto has not unreasonably impaired the functioning of the pri-
mary institutions of government.2 39 The likelihood of it presenting a
greater threat in the future through increased usage is remote in light of
the difficulties encountered in qualifying a measure for the ballot. Taken
together, these considerations support the notion that courts are obli-
gated to consider the right seriously, and should strike down a legislative
nullification except in those limited cases in which the act is necessary to
promote an immediate need or a compelling state interest.
24
0
After selecting the appropriate higher standard of review, the court
must balance the right of referral, not against legislative power per se,
but against the immediate need of a community to enforce a new law
without the delay occasioned by a referral. Courts that attempt to define
the restriction further do so in functional terms, emphasizing an event or
occurrence that if left unattended by legislative action will seriously im-
pair the public welfare.241 The crucial element in the formula is immedi-
236. See supra notes 88-92 & accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 38-105 & accompanying text.
238. The problem is determining what weight to attach to the popular veto in balancing it
against the costs of the process. H. HAMILTON & S. COHEN, supra note 44, at 273-75.
239. See supra note 238.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05; cf. Developments in the Law-The Na-
tional Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1293-1303 (1972) (dis-
cusses strict necessity test for emergency acts that deprive individual liberties).
241. "This exemption was not intended to extend further than to matters arising out of
some unforeseen menace, calamity, accident, sudden emergency, extraordinary occurrence, or
unprecedented climactic condition, rendering immediate action imperative." State ex rel. Vee-
der v. State Bd. of Educ., 97 Mont. 121, 129, 33 P.2d 516, 519 (1934). "The necessity of a law
for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety implies that unless the law is passed
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acy, signifying both the need for timely, but not necessarily
instantaneous, action and an exposure to a substantial risk of serious
harm in the absence of such action.242 The following five factors should
aid a court in this deliberation. They are not intended as a litmus test
and no one factor is indispensable; each factor should be considered in
the balancing process to illuminate the primary interests at state.
1. What will be the likely impact for the community, in whole or
part, if the effective date of the law is delayed pending the referral?2 43
2. Is the law directed at a specific, identifiable occurrence that
presents a substantial, yet short-term, threat to public welfare, 244 or is
the law aimed at a chronic social or economic problem that cannot be
solved without the long-term commitment of substantial human and
financial resources?2
45
3. Is the law narrowly drawn and limited in its impact to a small part
of the polity, or does it represent a fundamental policy choice for the
community in general?
246
4. Is the subject matter regulated by existing law that will remain in
effect pending the referendum?
2 47
5. Is the law more concerned with administrative effectiveness or
statutory uniformity than with the management and control of a short-
the public peace, health, and safety will be destroyed, or seriously impaired." State ex rel.
Durbin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 634, 133 N.E. 457, 469 (1921) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
The crisis, however, need not be unforeseen or unexpected. State ex reL Tyler v. Davis, 443
S.W.2d 625, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (held rioting sufficient emergency circumstance).
In New Mexico, which omits the word "immediate" from the limiting clause, N.M.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, no crisis or emergency need exist. "'All that is required... is that [the
act] bear a valid relationship ... to some permissible object for the exercise of [the police]
power.'" Otto v. Buck, 61 N.M. 123, 129, 295 P.2d 1028, 1033 (1956) (quoting Hughes v.
Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 238, 141 P.2d 192, 198 (1943)).
242. Clearly the drafters of the public safety exception could have been more precise in
defining its scope by including an additional adjective to describe the nature of the necessity,
together with its immediacy, such as "acutely necessary," "extremely necessary," or "critically
necessary." In any event, the interests at stake are relative in nature and abstract definitions
are of questionable value in determining the priority of competing factors. Cf. State ex rel.
Veeder v. State Bd. of Educ., 97 Mont. 121, 131-32, 33 P.2d 516, 521 (1934) (Emergency must
exist when legislature acts, but action need not be carried into effect immediately.).
243. See State ex rel. Wegner v. Pyle, 55 S.D. 269, 280, 226 N.W. 280, 284 (1929) (balanc-
ing test to determine necessity for support of state institutions). A balancing test is consistent
with an approach recommended for other forms of government regulation under its police
powers. See Comment, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88
YALE L.J. 1487, 1493 (1979).
244. E.g., State ex reL Taylor v. Davis, 443 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (rioting).
245. E.g., State ex reL Burt v. Hutchinson, 173 Wash. 72, 21 P.2d 514 (1933) (legislation
to provide funding of public old-age pension through proceeds of wagering on horse races).
246. E.g., Gravning v. Zellmer, 291 N.W.2d 751 (S.D. 1980) (legislation for public
purchase of a railroad).
247. E.g., State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 776, 380 P.2d 735, 737-38
(1963) (amendments to existing gaming statutes).
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term problem?
248
The first factor considers the potential harm to the community in
the absence of the protective legislation. One may assert that most of the
social, political, and economic problems of our time are serious in nature
and that if a legislative remedy is delayed by a referendum, there will be a
substantial adverse consequence for the society. In reality, the issues that
face us are not homogeneous in nature and vary in terms of intensity,
commonality, duration, intractability, and susceptibility to remedial
measures. Problems that are perceived as highly intense and explosive
may require quick legislative action-free from voter interference-re-
gardless of long-term policy implications. One example is the proposed
temporary remedy for the agriculture crisis-a moratorium on mortgage
foreclosures of family farms. Such a law probably will have some lasting
impact on agricultural policy, but the compelling interest outweighs the
referendum right. On the other hand, demonstrating a compelling inter-
est is more problematic with respect to the issue of whether a jurisdiction
should adopt a public lottery to bolster sagging finances. A lottery act
should not be exempt from the permissive referendum simply because,
pending the referendum, the absence of the revenue may squeeze operat-
ing budgets. If the situation is acute, then an interim measure may be
necessary. Otherwise, the electorate should not be foreclosed from evalu-
ating a fundamental shift in the sources of state or local revenue.
The second and third factors underscore the need for a legislative
override for those issues of limited scope and relatively short duration, or
those that can be dealt with in a temporary and restricted fashion. Two
examples are the legislative response to the AIDS crisis and a local ordi-
nance that bans the testing of new genetic crop frost inhibitors without
adequate safeguards for existing plants.
The fourth factor identifies whether a referendum will leave a field
completely void of any regulation pending the vote. Many public issues,
such as gun control, obscenity, unemployment, or chemical dependency
are subject to varying amounts of regulation and enforcement policy,
which remain intact pending the approval of a different policy. In the
absence of a compelling state interest or a limited solution to the prob-
lem, the ballot option should remain inviolate.
The last factor, administrative convenience, may arise in a legislative
attempt to consolidate public school districts in order to equalize tax as-
sessments and to promote efficiency and centralization. These can be
248. E.g., State ex rel. Kennedy v. Reeves, 22 Wash. 2d 677, 157 P.2d 721 (1945) (act
unifying control over state timber and creating State Timber Board).
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hotly contested issues and rarely, if ever, compel the nullification of a
permissive referendum.
These examples show how a balancing approach might work. Ad-
mittedly, the approach is not perfect; the outcome in many cases will
depend upon the weight a court attaches to the opposing sides of the
equation. Coupled with a stiff dose of judicial skepticism, however, this
approach should result in preserving the values of a permissive referen-
dum without undue harm to the community.
Conclusion
This Article reexamines a political right, known as the permissive
referendum, introduced by the Progressive movement at the turn of the
century as a means to control legislative abuses. The permissive referen-
dum is generally defined as the power of the electorate to independently
submit acts adopted by a legislative body to a vote of the people. This
type of referendum continues to function as a part of the initiative and
referendum machinery in place in many state and local jurisdictions.
Yet, until recently, few commentators have discussed the jurisprudence
of this process.
Several jurisdictions limit the exercise of the permissive referendum
power by express constitutional or statutory language that exempts laws
that are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety. Legislative bodies are permitted to trigger the exemp-
tion by stating that the act is a public safety measure. Courts are divided
over the issue of whether this legislative finding conclusively nullifies the
referendum option under all circumstances, or whether it is subject to
judicial review. The Article provides a political assessment of the per-
missive referendum right and evaluates its significance to a community.
The Article demonstrates that the permissive referendum right is an im-
portant democratic tool and that electors in general have exercised the
right responsibly.
The Article examines two lines of opposing authority on the issue of
reviewability. After analyzing the reasoning of decisions that support a
rule of nonreviewability, the Article concludes that this approach is in-
consistent with established constitutional doctrine and the intent of the
referendum process. The Article outlines the relevant standards of re-
view and suggests a balancing test to preserve the values of the permis-
sive referendum while isolating those cases of compelling public need.
Finally, the Article proposes several practical factors to aid a court in
this balancing process and illustrates how they may be used in different
cases to reach consistent results.
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